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PROGRESSIVE ERA CONCEPTIONS OF THE
CORPORATION
AND THE FAILURE OF THE FEDERAL
CHARTERING MOVEMENT
Camden Hutchison*
Despite the economic integration of the several states and
the broad regulatory authority of the federal government, the
internal affairs of business corporations remain primarily
governed by state law. The origins of this system are closely
tied to the decentralized history of the United States, but the
reasons for its continued persistence—in the face of
significant federalization pressures—are not obvious. Indeed,
federalization of corporate law was a major political goal
during the Progressive Era, a period which witnessed
significant expansion of federal involvement in the national
economy. By examining the historical record of Progressive
Era policy debates, this Article bridges the analytical gap
between historical and corporate legal scholarship, bringing
to light the specific reasons why a federal corporation law
was never enacted.
Drawing on primary source evidence, the conclusions of
this Article are as follows. First, proponents of federal
chartering were deeply divided in their attitudes toward
corporations, some viewing them as a dangerous threat,
others viewing them as central to economic progress. These
divisions led to conflicting views on the very purpose of
corporate regulation, making agreement on the content of a
federal corporation act unlikely. Second, notwithstanding
these divisions, many reformers viewed corporations as
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of Wisconsin Law School. Any errors are solely my own.
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directly accountable to the public interest. Legislative
proposals were therefore framed in terms of benefiting the
public, and only secondarily addressed the shareholder
interests that dominate corporate law today. Finally, it was
the conflicted nature of the political support for federal
chartering legislation—not any specific policy preference for
maintaining corporate law federalism—that led to the
persistence of state-based corporate law. Ultimately, the
absence of federal corporate law was a product of historical
circumstance, rather than any conscious determination of
legal or economic policy.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Among the most salient features of American corporate
law is its distinctly subnational structure. Under the U.S.
federal system, a corporation’s internal affairs—including
the rights and obligations of its managers and
shareholders—are governed by the substantive law of its
state of incorporation, not that of the federal government.
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Although the scope of federal corporate law has steadily
increased over the decades, making notable inroads in the
areas of securities regulation,1 proxy voting,2 gatekeeping,3
retirement fund investments,4 certain reorganizational
transactions,5 and—most recently—executive compensation,
board nominations, and disclosure by hedge fund and private
equity fund managers,6 the fundamental principles of
corporate governance remain within the purview of the
respective states. This traditional aspect of American
corporate law distinguishes it from that of most developed
countries, in which business corporations are formed and
governed under centralized national legislation.7
1 The issuance and sale of corporate securities is primarily governed
by the federal securities laws. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–
77aa (2012); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp
(2012).
2 See Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law:
Lessons from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1804–07 (2006).
3 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposed new obligations on
corporate gatekeepers such as auditors, securities analysts, and outside
legal counsel. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116
Stat. 745. For a discussion of corporate gatekeeping, see generally JOHN C.
COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(2006).
4 The management of employee retirement plans is broadly regulated
under federal law. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001–1169 (2012). See generally Kimberly Lynn Weiss, Note,
Directors’ Liability for Corporate Mismanagement of 401(k) Plans:
Achieving the Goals of ERISA in Effectuating Retirement Security, 38 IND.
L. REV. 817 (2005).
5 See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 590,
618–19 (2003).
6 These recent federal regulations were established under the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376. Although President Trump promised to “dismantle”
Dodd-Frank, it is uncertain whether any future reforms will affect the
law’s corporate governance provisions. See Jeff Cox, Why It Won’t Be Easy
for Trump to Repeal Dodd-Frank, CNBC (Nov. 21, 2016),
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/21/repeal-dodd-frank-it-wont-be-easy-fordonald-trump-to-end-the-rule.html [perma.cc/XM9F-MMB5].
7 A notable exception being Canada, where corporations can be
formed under either federal or provincial law. PURI ET AL., CASES,
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The federal structure of American corporate law figures
centrally in corporate legal scholarship, which is
intellectually dominated by the relationship between
management and shareholders. Beginning with Adolf Berle
and Gardiner Means’s seminal study of the modern
corporation,8 and continuing with the development of
modern finance theory in the 1960s and 1970s,9 corporate
scholars have closely attended to this fundamental
governance issue. This focus resulted in a long-running
debate over the merits of state corporate law, particularly
regarding state “competition” and the ensuing dominance of
the state of Delaware.10 Many scholars have argued that a
“race to the bottom” has degraded corporate governance
standards and that Delaware has attracted corporations by
favoring management over shareholders.11 Others have
MATERIALS AND NOTES ON PARTNERSHIPS AND CANADIAN BUSINESS
CORPORATIONS 167–68 (6th ed. 2016). See also Glenford Jameson,
Competing with Ourselves: Supply-Side Competition for Corporate
Charters in Canada, 50 ALTA. L. REV. 843 (2013).
8 ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932).
9 See THE MODERN THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 2–20 (Michael C.
Jensen & Clifford W. Smith eds., McGraw-Hill 1984).
10 Since corporations are essentially free to incorporate in any state of
their choosing (regardless of geographical presence), certain states have
tailored their laws to attract incorporation fees and franchise taxes.
Among these states, Delaware has been far and away the most successful.
It today serves as the legal home to more than half of all publically-traded
U.S. corporations and nearly two-thirds of the Fortune 500. JEFFREY W.
BULLOCK,
DEL.
DIV.
OF
CORPS.,
2013
ANNUAL
REPORT,
https://corp.delaware.gov/Corporations_2013%20Annual%20Report.pdf
[perma.cc/J67D-G4VV].
11 See, e.g., RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 54–
61 (1976); Oren Bar-Gill et al., The Market for Corporate Law, 162 J. INST.
& THEOR. ECON. 134, 137–41 (2006); Lucian Bebchuk, Federalism and the
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1440–45 (1992); Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note
2, at 1804–07; William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 663 (1974); Renee M. Jones,
Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J.
CORP. L. 625, 653 (2004); Stanley A. Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in
the Management of the Corporation, 31 BUS. LAW. 883, 885–87 (1976);
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argued that Delaware’s success is instead the result of a
“race to the top,” and that Delaware has provided the most
efficient balance between shareholder protection and
management prerogative.12 More recently, a number of
scholars have questioned the assumption that states actually
compete for incorporations at all, based on evidence that
Delaware has enjoyed an effective monopoly on out-of-state
incorporations for several decades (tempered only by the
periodic threat of federal legislation).13 Regardless of their
Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST.
L.J. 545, 556 (1984); Gordon G. Young, Federal Corporate Law,
Federalism, and the Federal Courts, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1997,
at 146, 151.
12 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 212–27 (1991); ROBERTA
ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); RALPH K.
WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 28–42 (1978); Barry D.
Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of
the Firm, 28 J.L. & ECON. 179, 184–90 (1985); Robert Daines, Does
Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 527 (2001);
Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware’s Corporate Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 913
(1982); Roberta Romano, Corporate Law as the Paradigm for Contractual
Choice of Law, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 370 (F.
Buckley ed., 1999); Roberta Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the
Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 226 (1985); Ralph K.
Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254 (1977).
13 See, e.g., Robert Anderson IV & Jeffrey Manns, The Delaware
Delusion, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1092–94 (2015); Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf
Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition
over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 555 (2002); Marcel Kahan &
Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 679, 684–85 (2002); Roe, supra note 5, at 590. Increasingly,
scholars characterize the market for incorporations as a binary “local
versus Delaware” market, in which firms incorporate either in the state in
which they are headquartered (for example, a Wisconsin-based corporation
incorporating under Wisconsin law) or in Delaware (a Wisconsin-based
corporation incorporating under Delaware law). A common view is that no
states (with the possible recent exception of Nevada) even attempt to
compete with Delaware for out-of-state incorporations. See Bruce H.
Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Nevada and the Market for Corporate
Law, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1165, 1167–68 (2012).
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specific perspectives on the state corporate law debate, most
of these scholars share two basic intellectual premises: (1)
state law provides the foundational legal rules into which
federal policy may selectively intervene; and (2) corporate
law should primarily focus on the economic interests of
shareholders. The positive corollaries of these premises—the
absence of comprehensive federal corporate law and the
limitation of management’s duties to shareholders
exclusively—are largely taken for granted, implicitly
portrayed as natural results of the American federal system
of government.14
In fact, neither premise commanded appreciable support
during the formative period of modern corporate law. By
examining Progressive Era political debates over federal
incorporation proposals, this Article shows that there was
nothing preordained about the state-based system of
corporate governance. At the turn of the twentieth century,
amidst dramatic growth of industrial corporations, the
possibility of federal chartering became a national political
issue. Federal chartering proposals, which—in their various
forms—would have added to, limited, or completely replaced
state corporation statutes, enjoyed the support of two sitting
presidents, both major political parties, and a broad array of
14 It should be emphasized that this naturalized view is the dominant
perspective in the legal literature. Historians of American business have
often conceptualized corporations (and corporate law) much differently.
For prominent examples of the variety of historical approaches to
corporations, see, e.g., JOHN WILLIAM CADMAN, JR., THE CORPORATION IN
NEW JERSEY: BUSINESS AND POLITICS, 1791–1875 (1949); ALFRED D.
CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); NAOMI LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER
MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895–1904 (1985); GLENN PORTER, THE
RISE OF BIG BUSINESS, 1860–1920 (1973); CONSTRUCTING CORPORATE
AMERICA: HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE (Kenneth Lipartito & David B.
Sicilia eds., 2004); Colleen Dunlavy, How Did American Business Get So
Big?, AUDACITY, Spring 1994, at 41; Colleen Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of
the Corporation: Insights from the History of Shareholder Voting Rights,
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 (2006); Oscar Handlin & Mary Handlin,
Origins of the American Business Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1945);
Charles W. McCurdy, American Law and the Marketing Structure of the
Large Corporation, 1875–1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631 (1978).
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political interests, including big business, organized labor,
and the national agricultural lobby. The policy concerns of
this federalization movement were unlike those of corporate
law today, however. Rather than focusing on the conflict of
interest
between
professional
management
and
shareholders, Progressive Era
reformers addressed
themselves to much broader questions of political economy,
including the fundamental nature of the corporation’s role in
modern industrial society. In seeking to directly regulate
large business corporations, Progressive Era proposals
implicated the power of both managers and shareholders,
the economic interests of which were only rarely
differentiated. Given their ambitious regulatory agenda, had
Progressive Era reformers succeeded in passing federal
chartering legislation, the institutional structure of
American business would look much different than it does
today.
This Article focuses on the historical moment in which
federalization had the strongest political support: the period
beginning with the “Great Merger Movement” of 1895–1904
and ending with the creation of the Federal Trade
Commission (the “FTC”) in 1914. These years were marked
by deep anxiety over the rise of national corporations and by
a strong sense among American policymakers of confronting
unprecedented economic change. In examining the responses
to this change, this Article follows several prior studies of the
period: beyond the canonical historiography of the
Progressive Era itself,15 historians such as Gabriel Kolko,
Martin Sklar, and Melvin Urofsky have specifically

The classic work on the Progressive Era (as well as the Populist
movement and the early New Deal) remains RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE
AGE OF REFORM (1955). Other important works include: SAMUEL P. HAYS,
THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1885–1914 (1957); MICHAEL MCGERR,
A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT
IN AMERICA 1870–1920 (2003); DANIEL T. ROGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS:
SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE (2000); ROBERT H. WIEBE,
BUSINESSMEN AND REFORM: A STUDY OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT (1962)
[hereinafter BUSINESSMEN AND REFORM]; ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH
FOR ORDER, 1877–1920 (1967), as well as many others.
15
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addressed progressive efforts to federalize corporate law.16
The Article extends beyond these previous studies in two
important respects. First, it pays greater attention to the
legal details of the period’s specific reform proposals. Second,
by comparing these proposals with more recent
developments in conceptions of the corporation, it more
clearly reveals that federalization efforts did not represent a
unified political movement, but rather embodied divergent
conceptions of corporations’ role in American society. Melvin
Urofsky, for example, who has authored the most specific
study of the federal incorporation movement to date, is
unable to satisfactorily explain why the movement failed,
arguing only that “a consensus on broad goals could not be
translated into agreement on specific details.”17 This Article
shows that federal incorporation proposals were actually
characterized by dissensus, and that different reformers
often advocated irreconcilable policy goals. This political
dissensus better explains the federalization movement’s
ultimate failure and the resulting entrenchment of the state
law system in the absence of federal legislation.
Specifically, by drawing on the historical record of federal
chartering proposals, this Article makes three central
arguments. First, although federal incorporation as an
abstract concept enjoyed broad political support, it was
undermined by a fundamental conflict between what this
Article labels “anti-corporate” and “corporatist” ideologies.18
“Anti-corporate” populists viewed large corporations as a
16 See GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963); MARTIN
J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM,
1890–1916 (1988); Melvin Urofsky, Proposed Federal Incorporation in the
Progressive Era, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 160 (1982). See also Theodore H.
Davis, Jr., Corporate Privileges for the Public Benefit: The Progressive
Federal Incorporation Movement and the Modern Regulatory State, 77 VA.
L. REV. 603 (1991).
17 Urofsky, supra note 16, at 160.
18 In this Article, “corporatism” is defined as cooperative management
of the national economy by government and large corporations. This
definition is distinct from—though not unrelated to—the conventional
definition of corporatism in political theory (i.e., the organization of society
through cooperation among major interest groups).
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dangerous threat to economic freedom and saw federal
legislation as a means of supplanting overly permissive state
corporation acts. “Corporatist” progressives, on the other
hand, viewed large corporations as central to economic
progress and saw federal legislation as a means of
supplanting overly restrictive state corporation acts. Second,
notwithstanding this core conflict, many reformers on both
sides of the debate believed corporate regulation should
serve the public interest and were therefore only secondarily
concerned with the economic interests of shareholders. At a
time when public shareholding was more limited, the conflict
of interest between management and shareholders was a less
significant policy issue. Finally, it was the conflicted nature
of the political support for federal chartering legislation, not
any specific policy preference for maintaining corporate law
federalism, that ultimately ensured the continued existence
of the state corporate law regime. In other words, the statebased structure of American corporate law was a default
outcome, not an active choice.
Together, these conclusions illustrate a broader historical
phenomenon—that institutional features of the American
economy are often shaped not by popular will, technocratic
expertise, or even special interest preferences, but simply by
the contingent nature of legislative politics.19 Regardless of
whether Delaware law is economically superior to its
alternatives (a question this Article does not address), its
prominence was hardly predetermined by the genius of
American federalism. Had early debates over federal
chartering occurred under different political circumstances,
the evolution of corporate law would likely have unfolded
differently.
Before proceeding, a note on terminology: In order to
capture all major proposals to impose federal standards on
corporate law, this Article employs a catholic definition of
federal “chartering” proposals. Specifically, the term
“chartering” includes any legislative proposal to (1) require
19 For an example of this phenomenon in the tax policy context, see
Camden Hutchison, The Historical Origins of the Debt-Equity Distinction,
18 FLA. TAX REV. 95 (2015).
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or permit businesses to incorporate under federal charters,
(2) require or permit businesses to obtain federal corporate
licenses, or (3) impose comprehensive federal standards on
the governance of state corporations. Although distinct in
form, these various legislative proposals were often similar
in substance, as each sought to replace—in whole or in
part—the variety of state laws with federal standardization.
A mandatory licensing system requiring compliance with
federal standards, for example, is little different from
imposing those standards directly though federal
incorporation. Thus, this Article includes each type of
proposal as part of a single federalization movement.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II
discusses the rise of corporate chartermongering and early
calls for federal reform. This Part explores the diversity of
perspectives that characterized early federalization
proposals. Part III examines the major federalization
proposals debated during the Theodore Roosevelt
Administration. This was the moment at which the political
conflict between corporatist and anti-corporate perspectives
was most stark. Part IV discusses the failure of
federalization proposals under William Howard Taft and the
effective end of the chartering movement following the
election of Woodrow Wilson. Part V concludes, assessing the
relevance of federalization efforts to current U.S. corporate
law.

II. STATE CORPORATE CHARTERMONGERING
AND CALLS FOR FEDERAL REFORM
Since the origins of the United States, the formation of
corporations has been a subject of state law. At the
Constitutional Convention, James Madison proposed
empowering Congress “to grant charters of incorporation
where the interest of the U.S. might require & the legislative
provisions of individual States may be incompetent.”20

20

14,

James Madison, Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 (Sept.
1787),
in
AVALON
PROJECT
(2017),
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Madison’s proposal was rejected, however, on the grounds
that federal corporations might lead to national monopolies.
21 Thus, although the federal government has chartered
specific corporations under the Necessary and Proper Clause,
including the first and second Banks of the United States,
the first transcontinental railroads, and the Tennessee
Valley Authority, general incorporation of private businesses
has remained limited to the states. To this day, nearly all
American corporations are chartered under state law, a
distinctive feature of American corporate governance.
During the nineteenth century, states facilitated
incorporation to promote local economic development. The
economic and technological advances of the post-Civil War
decades allowed locally incorporated businesses to grow
increasingly national in scope. As markets expanded and
geographical
distances
shrank,
states
encountered
constitutional obstacles to regulating “foreign,” or out-ofstate corporations.22 Not only did the Commerce Clause limit
state interference with interstate commerce, but under
established legal doctrine, a corporation’s internal affairs
were governed by its state of incorporation, regardless of the
geographical location of its business, assets, or operational
headquarters.23 Since corporate promoters24 were free to
incorporate in any state of their choosing, and since states
collected fees and taxes for the granting of corporate
charters, the circumstances emerged for states to compete to
attract out-of-state incorporations. New Jersey was the first
and most successful of these states, attracting the majority of
the largest combinations formed during the Great Merger
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_914.asp#16
[perma.cc/4XDL-34V7].
21 Id.
22 See, e.g., Norfolk & W.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U.S. 114, 120
(1890) (invalidating a Pennsylvania tax on foreign corporations).
23 For analysis of the historical origins of the corporate internal
affairs doctrine, see generally Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins
of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP. L. 33 (2006).
24 “Promoters” was the historical term for the owners, managers, and
financial intermediaries who organized incorporations, particularly for
public investment.
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Movement.25 Certain states—such as Delaware, Maine, and
West Virginia—attempted to compete with New Jersey by
liberalizing their corporation laws.26 Other states—such as
Ohio, Illinois, and Massachusetts—continued to maintain
their traditional restrictions on corporations’ size and
business activities.27 As discussed below, this legal diversity
contributed to the conflicted nature of the federal chartering
movement: Simply put, certain proponents of federal
legislation were opposed to the laws of states like Ohio, while
other proponents of federal legislation were opposed to the
laws of states like New Jersey.

A. New Jersey Chartermongering
New Jersey was the original winner of the “race” to
attract incorporations. In 1846, New Jersey enacted a
general incorporation law intended to facilitate capital
formation, providing corporations greater structural freedom
than many larger industrial states.28 Revisions in 1875
provided even greater flexibility, while also eliminating the
25 For a listing of all “trusts” existing as of 1904, the majority of which
were incorporated in New Jersey, see JOHN MOODY, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE
TRUSTS 453–75 (1904). For detailed figures on incorporations in New
Jersey, see also Charles Yablon, The Historical Race Competition for
Corporate Charters and the Rise and Decline of New Jersey: 1880–1910, 32
J. CORP L. 323, 377–80 (2007).
26 See Yablon, supra note 25, at 359–67.
27 For contemporaneous discussions of relatively restrictive state
laws, see 1 INDUSTR. COMM’N, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON TRUSTS AND
INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS, TOGETHER WITH TESTIMONY, REVIEW OF
EVIDENCE, CHARTS SHOWING EFFECTS OF PRICES, AND TOPICAL DIGEST 297–
330, 1035, 1133–34 (1900) [hereinafter INDUSTR. COMM’N, PRELIMINARY
REPORT]. These laws could have significant consequences for in-state
corporations. For example, Standard Oil Company was sued—and nearly
dissolved—by the Ohio attorney general for actions considered ultra vires
under Ohio’s corporation law. Standard Oil Company subsequently
reorganized under the holding company Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey.
28 See Edward Quinton Keasbey, Address to Chicago Conference on
Trusts: New Jersey and the Trusts (Sept. 15, 1899), in CHICAGO
CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS: SPEECHES, DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS, LISTS OF THE
DELEGATES, COMMITTEES, ETC. 383 (Civic Fed’n of Chi. ed., 1900)
[hereinafter CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS].
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traditional practice of incorporation by special legislative
act.29 In addition to its liberal corporation statute, New
Jersey also benefited from low corporate taxes and a wellregarded conservative judiciary.30 For these reasons, New
Jersey had become an attractive destination for corporations
even before the 1880s.31 Building on its existing reputation
as a corporate-friendly jurisdiction, New Jersey emerged as
the earliest state to actively promote itself to out-of-state
capital.32
Legislative reforms in the late 1880s and 1890s solidified
New Jersey’s position as the jurisdiction of choice for large
industrial corporations. The most significant of these reforms
were devised by James B. Dill, a talented and ambitious
Wall Street attorney who lived across the river in New
Jersey. In 1890, Dill suggested to Leon Abbett, the
Democratic governor of New Jersey (and a former corporate
attorney himself), that New Jersey further revise its
corporation laws.33 At the time, Abbett was in search of
additional tax revenue to balance New Jersey’s budget
29 Id. at 386. Historically, incorporation by a specific legislative act
had been the typical means of forming a corporation, but this practice fell
into public disfavor by the middle of the nineteenth century. During the
Jacksonian era, many Americans viewed special incorporation as an
instrument of privilege and monopoly, and nearly every state eliminated
the practice by the latter decades of the century. See Gregory A. Mark, The
Role of the State in Corporate Law Formation, in 1 INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATE LAW ANNUAL 1, 5–9 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2000).
30 New Jersey’s corporate franchise tax was levied at a maximum rate
of 0.1% of paid-in capital, with decreasing marginal rates for increasingly
greater capitalizations. For large corporations, this resulted in a lower
effective tax rate than (for example) New York’s. For contemporary
discussion of New Jersey’s corporation taxes, see 2 INDUSTR. COMM’N,
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON TRUSTS AND INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS, TOGETHER
WITH TESTIMONY, REVIEW OF EVIDENCE, CHARTS SHOWING EFFECTS OF
PRICES, AND TOPICAL DIGEST 21, 975, 1077 (1899). According to the
journalist Lincoln Steffens, the New Jersey judiciary was highly regarded
by Wall Street lawyers. Lincoln Steffens, New Jersey: A Traitor State,
MCCLURE’S MAG., Apr. 1905, at 649, 658.
31 See Yablon, supra note 25, at 332–36.
32 Id. at 328.
33 Urofsky, supra note 16, at 163.
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deficit, while Dill was seeking a streamlined mechanism for
organizing his clients’ businesses; the two men quickly
agreed on a mutually beneficial reform program.34 Pursuant
to Dill’s plan, which Abbett recommended to the state
legislature, New Jersey revised its corporation act in 1893 so
as to clearly authorize New Jersey corporations to acquire
the stock and/or assets of out-of-state firms.35 Three years
later, in 1896, the entire act was fully recodified by a revision
commission chaired by Dill.36 This recodification, which
significantly streamlined the act’s requirements, is widely
considered the first modern “enabling” corporation statute.37
The new statute played an important role in facilitating
corporate mergers, as reflected by New Jersey’s prominent
position in the growing national merger movement.38
Between 1895 and 1904, approximately 50% of all industrial

34 See The Lawyer Who Earned Title of Being Father of the Trusts,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 1907, at 6. There is also evidence that Abbett and
other New Jersey politicians were able to reap personal financial benefits
from Dill’s reform plan. Together with Dill, Abbett was a stockholder in
the Corporation Trust Company of New Jersey, a company founded by Dill
to facilitate New Jersey incorporations. Urofsky, supra note 16, at 163.
35 Act of Mar. 14, 1893, ch. 171, 1893 N.J. Laws 301 (providing for
general intercorporate stockholding). Although previous scholars have
written that New Jersey’s first “holding company” laws were passed in
1888 and 1889, these earlier laws were of only narrow application. See Act
of Apr. 4, 1888, ch. 269, 1888 N.J. Laws 385 (providing, redundantly, that
corporations “authorized by law to own and hold shares of stock and bonds
of corporations” could hold and dispose of the same); Act of Apr. 17, 1888,
ch. 295, 1888 N.J. Laws 445 (providing for intercorporate stockholding by
certain real estate and transportation corporations). A law passed in 1889
was broader, but seemed limited to mining and manufacturing companies.
See Act of May 9, 1889, ch. 265, 1889 N.J. Laws 412. Additional industryspecific laws were passed in 1891. The 1893 law was the first
unambiguous authorization to purchase and hold the stock of any
corporation, in any industry, whether or not formed in New Jersey.
36 Urofsky, supra note 16, at 163–64.
37 As opposed to the restrictive statutes that constituted the historical
norm. See Yablon, supra note 25, at 349–53.
38 The new statute was enacted as an act concerning corporations. Act
of Apr. 21, 1986, ch. 185, 1896 N.J. Laws 277.
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consolidations were incorporated in New Jersey;39 between
1896 and 1901, the state’s annual incorporations increased
nearly 200%;40 and by 1904, all seven of John Moody’s
“greater industrial trusts” had incorporated in New Jersey.41
These developments had a major effect on New Jersey’s
corporate tax revenue, which more than tripled from less
than one million dollars in 1895 to nearly three million
dollars in 1905.42 By any measure, Dill’s plan was a
remarkable success.
As New Jersey attracted a growing share of the nation’s
largest corporations, other states took notice. Hoping to
capture a portion of New Jersey’s rising incorporation
revenues, states including Maine, South Dakota, and West
Virginia passed corporation laws that were even less
restrictive than New Jersey’s.43 Delaware adopted a
corporation act nearly identical to the New Jersey statute,
attempting to compete for corporations by charging lower
fees and franchise taxes.44 Even highly industrialized states
such as New York and Massachusetts were forced to revise
their corporate laws to avoid losing corporations to New
Jersey.45 With several states actively vying to attract and
39 RALPH L. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY,
1895–1956, at 67 (1959).
40 Urofsky, supra note 16, at 164.
41 MOODY, supra note 25, at 453. These firms were: Amalgamated
Copper Company, American Smelting and Refining Co., American Sugar
Refining Co., Consolidated Tobacco Co., International Merchant Marine
Company, Standard Oil Company, and United States Steel Company. Id.
42 Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering,
1875–1929, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 677, 682 (1989).
43 See Yablon, supra note 25, at 358–67.
44 Grandy, supra note 42, at 685. Although the two acts were very
similar (Delaware lawyers expressly marketed their state’s act as being
based on the New Jersey act), Delaware law was more permissive with
respect to the sale of stock, the location of corporate meetings, and certain
other specific provisions. See William Jennings Bryan, Address to Chicago
Conference on Trusts: The Man Before the Dollar (Sept. 16, 1899), in
CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, at 494, 506–08. Of course,
Delaware would eventually replace New Jersey as the preferred
incorporation jurisdiction.
45 See Yablon, supra note 25, at 358–67, 370–71.
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retain corporations, this period represented the historical
peak of state corporate law competition.
For many contemporary observers, this competition was
cause for alarm. At the turn of the century, public attitudes
toward corporations were dominated by antitrust sentiment,
and the liberalizing reforms of individual states were seen as
enabling monopolistic trusts. Although the Sherman Act of
1890 prohibited efforts to monopolize,46 many Americans
feared indulgent state governments were nonetheless
encouraging dangerous consolidation.47 A famous example of
this view was the muckraking journalism of Lincoln Steffens,
whose McClure’s Magazine article New Jersey: A Traitor
State accused New Jersey politicians of betraying the
country in exchange for local tax revenues.48 According to
Steffens, New Jersey was fostering national monopolies in
order to maximize tax collections—a specific example of a
broader phenomenon of corrupt, parochial-minded state
government. Fearing the economic consequences of
permissive state corporation laws, many in American politics
began to call for federal standards. In the late 1890s, these
calls led to serious discussions regarding the desirability and
constitutionality of a federal corporate chartering act. The
two most prominent examples—each highlighting a different
perspective on the fundamental goals of corporate
regulation—were the Chicago Conference on Trusts, held in
1899, and the proceedings of the U.S. Industrial
Commission, held from 1898 to 1902.

B. The Chicago Conference on Trusts
At the end of the nineteenth century, Americans were
keenly aware of the economic changes occurring around
them. The traditional economic model of small, independent

Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
This concern is suggested by William Jennings Bryan’s comments,
see infra notes 56–61 and accompanying text, which were received with
“some minutes” of applause and a “crowd which rushed forward to
congratulate him.” Bryan supra note 44, at 514.
48 Steffens, supra note 30, at 649–50.
46
47
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businesses—central to the economic ideology of nineteenthcentury America—was rapidly ceding to a new reality of
large, integrated corporations, many of which had dominated
their industries in the span of only a few short years.
Concern over these corporations’ economic power led to state
and federal antitrust legislation, as well as calls for the
federal government to assume direct control over
corporations themselves. In this respect, the antitrust
movement and federal chartering proposals were closely
interrelated. Although today the word “trust” connotes
economic monopoly—and “antitrust” connotes anti-monopoly
policy—the popular meaning of both of these terms was
significantly broader during the Progressive Era.49 In both
the public and political vernacular of the time, a “trust” was
simply any large corporation, while “corporation” could refer
to any large trust. The “trust” issue in American politics was
therefore synonymous with the “corporation” issue, and
“antitrust” policy concerned any business that operated on a
national scale. As stated by James B. Dill, the popular (if
legally inaccurate) understanding of the term “trust” was
simply “a corporate aggregation engaged in business other
than merely local, and not confined in its operations and
scope to the state of its creation.”50
Although Congress had responded to growing antitrust
sentiment with the Sherman Act of 1890, limited
enforcement of the statute’s prohibitions had produced
equally limited results.51 As concern over the trust issue
continued to mount—and as state law appeared increasingly
ineffective—many public figures began to advocate more
49 The term “trust” was originally a reference to the practice of
organizing large businesses as actual legal trusts. The legal motivations
for this practice were obviated by the liberalization of state corporate law,
after which most trusts reorganized as corporations. The general public
continued to refer to all large businesses as trusts, however.
50 James B. Dill, National Incorporation Laws for Trusts, 11 YALE L.J.
273, 274–75 (1902).
51 While outright cartelization declined, industrial consolidation
significantly increased in the decade following the Sherman Act. See HANS
B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINS OF AN AMERICAN
TRADITION 285–308 (1955).

HUTCHISON – FINAL

1034

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2017

ambitious policy alternatives. It was in this context that the
Civic Federation of Chicago, a major business reform
organization, convened the Chicago Conference on Trusts
late in the summer of 1899. The conference assembled a wide
range of figures from government, academics, journalism,
labor, the legal profession, and elsewhere to discuss potential
legal and political responses to the rise of national trusts.
The conference’s stated objective was not to attack the
trusts, but merely to facilitate the exchange of ideas. In the
words of Franklin Head, President of the Civic Federation of
Chicago, “it is not a trust or an anti-trust conference, but a
conference in search of truth and light.”52 In this spirit, an
impressive variety of ideological perspectives were
represented at the conference, from socialists to laissez-faire
conservatives, and everything in-between. National political
and intellectual figures including William Jennings Bryan,
Bourke Cockran, Samuel Gompers, John Bates Clark,
Jeremiah Jenks, and even James B. Dill each presented
their particular views on how best to address the trust issue.
Notwithstanding this diversity, federal incorporation or
licensing of corporations emerged as a common policy
proposal. The conference was therefore the first occasion for
sustained discussion of federal chartering, laying the
groundwork for subsequent developments within the federal
government itself.
The general sentiment of the conference was that state
corporate law was seriously inadequate. Regardless of their
specific perspectives on the dangers and/or benefits of
industrial combination, most conferees agreed that some
form of federal regulation was necessary. In general, what
drove this agreement was not primarily concern for corporate
investors, whose economic interests were rarely recognized
as distinct from those of corporate management. In 1899—
still the early days of public shareholding—the separation of
ownership and control was a less prominent feature of

52 Franklin J. Head, President, Civic Fed’n of Chi., Address to
Chicago Conference on Trusts (Sept. 13, 1899), in CHICAGO CONFERENCE
ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, at 7.
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American corporations.53 While participants at the
conference had various reasons for supporting federal
legislation, a common concern was protecting the public from
concentrated economic power. Given the liberalization of
state corporate law and the rapid growth of national
combinations, many conferees feared that individual state
governments had abandoned their responsibility to the
public interest.
This fear reflected a conception of corporations much
different from that of modern legal scholarship. Rather than
viewing the corporate form as an enabling mechanism for
private enterprise—the mainstream academic view of
corporations today—many at the time continued to view
corporations as quasi-public instruments of the state, whose
legal privileges were predicated upon provision of a public
benefit. According to several conferees, corporations had
become dangerous because they were no longer limited to
public purposes: Since states such as New Jersey had
authorized corporations to engage in any lawful business,
their statutory legal advantages (limited liability, continual
existence, etc.) allowed them to dominate the American
economy.54 This view of corporations as instruments of
public policy—and the implicit rejection of private profit as a
legitimate public policy goal—would significantly influence
political debates over the proper purposes of federal
chartering.

53 Although the Great Merger Movement represented the beginning of
public shareholding of industrial corporations, truly widespread public
shareholding would not emerge until the 1920s. See JONATHAN BARRON
BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 193–97
(1997).
54 See, e.g., Dudley G. Wooten, Member, Texas Legislature, Address to
Chicago Conference on Trusts (Sept. 13, 1899), in CHICAGO CONFERENCE
ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, at 42; Henry White, General Secretary, United
Garment Workers of America, Address to Chicago Conference on Trusts
(Sept. 15, 1899), in CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS 323; John B. Conner,
Chief, Indiana Bureau of Statistics, Address to Chicago Conference on
Trusts (Sept. 13, 1899), in CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS, supra note 28,
at 340.

HUTCHISON – FINAL

1036

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2017

The conception of corporations that characterized the
Chicago conference is well illustrated by its most famous
attendee, the once and future presidential candidate William
Jennings Bryan. While many speakers at the Chicago
conference issued general calls for federal reform, Bryan
presented a more specific proposal for a federal corporate
licensing system. Speaking before a packed, enthusiastic
audience the morning of September 16, 1899, Bryan began
by outlining the failings of state corporate law.55 Using the
example of Delaware, which was eagerly attempting to
compete with New Jersey, Bryan claimed that irresponsible
state governments were fostering dangerous economic
concentration. In Bryan’s dramatic rhetoric, the interests of
natural “God-made man” were being sacrificed to
corporations, “the man-made man.”56 To emphasize his
point, Bryan read his audience an advertisement from a
Delaware incorporation service that extolled the lack of legal
restrictions in Delaware’s general corporation act.57 Bryan
maintained that such brazen appeals to trust-promoters
were clear evidence that state governments were
disregarding the public interest. According to Bryan, since
Delaware and other chartermongering states were
financially motivated to favor corporations, “protection of the
public from the greed and avarice of great aggregations of
wealth” required national legislation.58
Bryan’s own proposal was legislation requiring all
corporations in interstate commerce to apply for and
maintain a federal license. In order to control the “man-made
man,” this license would be predicated on three
requirements: (1) licensees would be prohibited from having

55 Bryan was an extremely popular orator, as evidenced by his
reception at the conference. See, e.g., CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS 459,
494, 496, 514.
56 Bryan, supra note 44, at 510–11.
57 Id. at 503–05.
58 Id. at 508.
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any “watered stock” in their capital structure;59 (2) licensees
would be prohibited from having a monopoly in any line of
business; and (3) licensees would be required to disclose the
details of their business operations.60 Each of these
conditions was meant to protect the public, rather than
investors—Bryan spoke in general terms of the dangers of
“corporations” and made no distinction between investors
and management. To modern readers, requiring financial
disclosure and prohibiting the sale of overvalued stock may
seem like investor protection measures, but this was not
Bryan’s goal. In the assessment of Bryan and many of his
contemporaries, these measures would actually prevent
investors from profiting at public expense.
This became clear in the controversy over “watered
stock,” or the practice of selling stock for more than the value
of a company’s assets. The central concern was not that
investors were being defrauded, as one might assume.
Rather, since dividend payments were often set at a fixed
percentage of nominal par value, inflated capital values
increased the pressure on management to maximize profits
in order to satisfy the cash flow requirements of high fixeddividend obligations.61 According to many critics, pressure to
pay higher dividends was the reason for (allegedly)
monopolistic prices.62 Although there was also worry that
outside shareholders might be deceived by inflated stock
59 The sale of “watered stock”—stock issued in excess of the value of a
corporation’s assets—was one of the most controversial corporate practices
of the period. See infra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
60 Bryan, supra note 44, at 506–08.
61 The payment of dividends on common stock was not a legal
obligation. However, given the information asymmetries that
characterized early American securities markets, steady payment of fixed
dividends was an important signal to investors of financial health. See
BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 53, at 5–7.
62 See, e.g., Cyrus G. Luce, Former Governor of Michigan, Address to
Chicago Conference on Trusts (Sept. 14, 1899), in CHICAGO CONFERENCE
ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, at 230, 231–32; Bryan, supra note 44, at 496,
506–08; T. B. Walker, Minneapolis Board of Trade, Address to Chicago
Conference on Trusts: Trusts From a Business Man’s Standpoint (Sept. 16,
1899), in CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, at 539, 539–41.
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values, the greater concern was that elevated dividends were
effectively a wealth transfer from consumers to investors.
Again, this historical understanding of corporate finance
differs significantly from the modern view, which is
primarily concerned with corporate management failing to
maximize returns to investors. Indeed, there is even an
ironic parallel between this early conception of dividend
obligations and the claim by modern financial economists
that debt service obligations can discipline management.63
The requirement of corporate disclosure, referred to by
Bryan as “publicity,” was also conceived primarily as a
means of protecting the public welfare. Bryan was not alone
in calling for disclosure—“publicity” was a major goal of
reformers throughout the Progressive Era. Unlike the
modern conception of corporate disclosure, publicity was not
viewed as a form of investor protection, but rather as a
mechanism for preventing monopolistic profits. Bryan stated
confidently that publicity would benefit the consuming
public, even if his basis for this prediction was not entirely
clear. Without explaining how or why, Bryan merely
asserted that corporate publicity would represent a “long
step toward the destruction of monopoly.”64 Parsing Bryan’s
rhetoric, the implication seemed to be that once the public
learned the details of corporations’ profits, they would no
longer tolerate excessive prices.65 Bryan’s contemporaries
were rarely clearer in justifying publicity’s importance,
though they presented it as a panacea for a host of economic
issues. As a general matter, anti-corporate populists were
often vague in explaining the benefits of their proposals,

63 The theory that leverage can discipline management was first
advanced by Michael Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305 (1976). Although not uncontroversial, this theory remains
influential in financial economics.
64 Bryan, supra note 44, at 508.
65 Id. A more economically plausible theory is that disclosure of high
profits would attract new competition, thus lowering prices. This theory
(expressed in somewhat inchoate language) was occasionally advanced by
other Progressive Era reformers.
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which often entailed unacknowledged conflicts between the
economic interests of consumers and investors.
Given his influence within the Democratic Party and his
broader prominence in American politics, Bryan represents a
particularly important example of the anti-corporate political
perspective. However, many other figures at the Chicago
conference also expressed similar views. To name but a few,
Representative Francis G. Newlands (D-NV), who would
subsequently introduce several chartering bills in Congress,
argued that state regulation of corporations was “impossible”
and that only the federal government could control corporate
power.66 Henry C. Adams, professor of political economy at
Cornell University and statistician for the Interstate
Commerce Commission, strongly criticized state corporation
laws for failing to protect the public welfare.67 A. E. Rogers,
a professor of constitutional law at the University of Maine,
issued similar criticisms and called for the imposition of
federal standards.68 In their preference for federal over state
legislation, all of these speakers were more concerned with
protecting the public than with protecting investors. In the
words of attorney R. S. Taylor, “the interests of investors in
the shares of [trusts] is a small consideration beside the
interest of the general mass of people whose food, clothing,
and transportation are controlled by them.”69 Ultimately, the
chairman of the conference, William Howe, remarked during
the closing of discussions that nearly every participant—
whatever their political views—agreed on the importance of
national standards. Howe summarized the conference as
66 Representative
Francis G. Newlands, Address to Chicago
Conference on Trusts (Sept. 14, 1899), in CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS,
supra note 28, at 305, 306.
67 See Henry C. Adams, Statistician, Interstate Commerce Comm’n,
Address to Chicago Conference on Trusts (Sept. 13, 1899), in CHICAGO
CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, at 35, 39.
68 A. E. Rogers, Univ. of Me., Address to Chicago Conference on
Trusts (Sept. 15, 1899), in CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS, supra note 28,
at 409, 422.
69 R. S. Taylor, Attorney, Address to Chicago Conference on Trusts
(Sept. 13, 1899), in CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, at 72,
72.
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having established the necessity of (1) strong, uniform
antitrust legislation, (2) centralized control over the
formation of corporations, (3) stricter regulation of the sale of
stock and bonds, and (4) a uniform system of corporate
publicity.70 According to Howe, the message of the conference
was that corporations should be controlled “as we control
steam and electricity, which are also dangerous if not
carefully managed, but of wonderful usefulness if rightly
harnessed to the car of progress.”71
The Chicago Conference on Trusts was an important
event in the national discussion of the corporation issue, but
it was only one of many sources of federal chartering
proposals. Moreover, despite the efforts of the conference’s
organizers to achieve political and ideological diversity, the
conference included few representatives of large corporations
themselves—one of the most important constituencies in
debates over corporate reform. Partly for this reason, the
prevailing theme of the Chicago conference was constraining
the power of corporations, and the balance of speakers was
decidedly weighted toward the anti-corporate perspective.
Concurrently with the Chicago conference, a different
outlook on federal chartering emerged from another
important political event. The investigative hearings of the
U.S. Industrial Commission, spanning 1898–1902, featured
much greater involvement from the business community,
including the leaders of several of the nation’s largest
corporations. Surprisingly, many of these businessmen72 also
supported federal chartering legislation, though for different
reasons than the anti-corporate reformers so vocal at the
Chicago conference.

70 William Wirt Howe, New Orleans Board of Trade, Address to
Chicago Conference on Trusts (Sept. 16, 1899), in CHICAGO CONFERENCE
ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, at 623, 624–25. Note, however, that in light of
the Chicago conference’s ecumenical philosophy, the committee on
resolutions declined to adopt any official resolutions. See id. at 625–26.
71 Id.
72 To the author’s knowledge, all of the businesspeople involved in
these debates were men.
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C. The Industrial Commission
Like the Chicago Conference on Trusts, the U.S.
Industrial Commission was a response to the dramatic
economic changes of the era. Unlike the Chicago conference,
however, which had no formal connection to the federal
government, the Industrial Commission was a federal body
created by congressional legislation.73 Its mandate was also
broader, encompassing not only trusts, but a wide range of
economic issues. The commission was formed in 1898 to
“investigate questions pertaining to immigration, to labor, to
agriculture, to manufacturing, and to business,” and to
recommend appropriate legislation.74 It was composed of a
somewhat ungainly roster of nine presidential appointees
(drawn primarily from business and labor), five sitting U.S.
senators, and five sitting U.S. representatives. Taking
inspiration from the British Royal Commissions of the 1890s,
the Industrial Commission conducted several investigations,
held numerous hearings, and ultimately issued 19 volumes’
worth of official reports. The commission’s work on the
subject of trusts and industrial combinations included a
comprehensive survey of state corporation laws,75 a detailed
study of corporate business and financial practices,76 and
extensive testimony from corporate managers.77 This
management testimony is particularly germane, as it reveals
that while many businessmen favored federal chartering
legislation, their support had little to do with limiting
corporate power.
Unlike anti-corporate reformers who believed state laws
were too permissive, many witnesses before the Industrial

73
74

See Act of June 18, 1898, 30 Stat. 476 (1898).
Simon North, The Industrial Commission, 168 N. AM. REV. 708, 709

(1899).
75 See generally 2 INDUSTR. COMM’N, TRUSTS AND INDUSTRIAL
COMBINATIONS (1900).
76 See generally 13 INDUSTR. COMM’N, TRUSTS AND INDUSTRIAL
COMBINATIONS (1901).
77 See generally INDUSTR. COMM’N, PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note
27.
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Commission believed that state laws were too burdensome.
Although these “corporatist” reformers also desired federal
law, their ideal vision of corporate law was more in line with
that of New Jersey. Notwithstanding the freedom of
promoters to incorporate in any state of their choosing, the
antitrust laws of certain states reached all activities within
their jurisdiction, creating legal risks for corporations
operating on a national basis. Business leaders hoped that
national legislation would preempt these troublesome state
laws, eliminating the danger of legal attack by state
attorneys general and private plaintiffs. More ambitiously,
they also hoped that federal legislation would supersede
federal antitrust law by creating a process through which
industrial combinations could apply for and receive federal
regulatory approval.
The witnesses before the Industrial Commission
represented many of the country’s largest businesses.
Perhaps the most notable was Standard Oil, among the most
powerful—and controversial—of all American industrial
trusts.78 The commission questioned several members of
Standard Oil’s senior management on a range of issues
related to conditions in the oil industry. Although most of
this questioning focused on the details of Standard Oil’s
business practices, three Standard Oil witnesses were also
asked for their views on federal incorporation: John D.
Rockefeller, the founder of the company; John D. Archbold,
the company’s de facto chief executive; and Henry H. Rogers,
another important senior manager. In their responses, each
of these men supported the prospect of federal incorporation
as a means of reforming, standardizing, and rationalizing
corporate law.
Despite being semi-retired from active management,79
John D. Rockefeller was questioned on the history and
structure of the oil industry. Responding to written
78 “Standard Oil” was formally “Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey,” the
holding company of what had existed as the “Standard Oil Trust” until
1892.
79 See DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY &
POWER 82–84 (2008).
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interrogatories in late 1899, Rockefeller suggested that the
federal government encourage the process of industrial
consolidation. He staunchly defended his company’s
domination of the oil industry and unequivocally maintained
that industrial combinations benefited American consumers.
Although he addressed the specific question of a federal
corporation law only briefly, his views on the subject could
not have been clearer—he strongly recommended “federal
legislation under which corporations may be created and
regulated.”80 If federal legislation proved impossible,
Rockefeller recommended uniform state laws as a secondbest alternative. The important point for Rockefeller was
that corporate reform, whether enacted at the federal or
state level, be directed toward “encouraging combinations of
persons and capital,” and “not of a character to hamper
industries.”81 While he criticized federal antitrust legislation
as fundamentally misguided, Rockefeller was open to the
concept of federal regulation and control. As had William
Howe at the Chicago Conference on Trusts, Rockefeller
compared industrial combinations to the instrumentality of
steam
power:
potentially
dangerous
if
employed
irresponsibly, but immensely beneficial if properly governed.
Just as “steam is necessary and can be made comparatively
safe,” he wrote, “combination is necessary and its abuses can
be minimized.”82
John D. Archbold—Standard Oil’s chief executive—took a
similar position on the subject of federal corporate law.83
Archbold believed that the natural “next step” in American
business was “national or federal corporations.”84 According
to Archbold, “lack of uniformity in the laws of the various
states, as affecting business corporations, is one of the most
vexatious features attending the business life of any great
INDUSTR. COMM’N, PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 27, at 797.
Id.
82 Id.
83 Archbold’s official position was Vice President of Standard Oil Co.
of New Jersey, but he effectively controlled the entire firm by 1899. See
YERGIN, supra note 79, at 82–84.
84 INDUSTR. COMM’N, PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 27, at 565.
80
81

HUTCHISON – FINAL

1044

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2017

corporation.”85 Standardizing corporate law would not only
benefit “great” corporations, but could also encourage new
competition to enter existing markets. Archbold claimed that
if a federal corporation law were passed, “any branch of
business could be freely entered upon by all comers, and the
talk of monopoly would be forever done away with.”86
Of the three Standard Oil executives who specifically
discussed federal chartering, Henry Rodgers—President of
Standard Oil’s pipeline subsidiary and a key figure within
the larger firm—addressed the issue in greatest detail. Like
Rockefeller and Archbold, Rogers favored enactment of a
single national corporation act. Specifically, Rogers proposed
a federal law in the model of the English Companies Acts.87
Rogers found the English law “most desirable in its
operation,” as it provided management with substantial
flexibility in organizing and running the business, while at
the same time providing outside investors with considerable
information rights.88 Another source of Rogers’s views was
his negative experiences with the state law system. In
particular, Rogers hoped that a federal law would reduce the
amount of antitrust litigation that could be brought in
multiple states.89 Finally, Rogers was also concerned about
the economic interests of shareholders, as indicated by his
strong support for generous information rights. Although he
believed that attempts by government to “regulate
speculation” would prove futile, he also believed that
investors should be entitled to accurate financial
information.90 In Rogers’s words: “I think we should say to

Id.
Id.
87 English corporate law was set forth in an extended series of
parliamentary acts, referred to in this Article collectively as the “English
Companies Acts.” English law had a major influence on liberal state
corporation acts, most notably that of New Jersey. James B. Dill himself
stated that the New Jersey corporation act was “largely founded upon the
English act.” See id. at 1082.
88 Id. at 585.
89 See id.
90 Id. at 586.
85
86
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the public, ‘Here is this property. You can investigate it if
you want to, and if you are satisfied with the security you
can put your money into it, and if you are not satisfied with
the security don’t put the money in.’”91 In this sense, Rogers
anticipated the regulatory philosophy of the federal
securities laws, in that he advocated disclosure rather than
policing the substantive fairness of securities transactions.
Standard Oil was but one of the corporations represented
at the commission’s hearings—senior executives of several
other firms also testified on federal chartering.92 Many of
these executives shared John D. Rockefeller’s willingness to
accept federal regulation in the form of corporate law. A
notable example was John W. Gates, chairman of the
American Steel and Wire Company. Gates not only
recommended federal incorporation, but also suggested that
the federal government take an active role in supervising the
market. Like many businessmen, Gates viewed federal
chartering primarily in terms of limiting state law. Under
his proposal, corporations would be protected from the
corporate laws of the individual states in exchange for
“substantial” chartering fees payable to the federal
government.93 Gates’s proposal extended beyond mere legal
protection, however. Drawing on his observations of German
industrial syndicalism, Gates envisioned the federal
government taking an active role in managing key
industries—overseeing and subsidizing America’s largest
corporations. Highly mindful of European competition, Gates
believed that government stewardship was necessary to

Id.
In addition to Standard Oil, the organizations represented at the
commission’s hearings on trusts and combinations included the American
Smelting and Refining Company, American Steel and Wire Company,
American Steel Hoop Company, American Sugar Refining Company,
American Thread Company, American Tin Plate Company, Distilling
Company of America, Federal Steel Company, Glucose Refining Company,
International Silver Company, National Shear Company, National Starch
Company, National Steel Company, Pittsburg Coal Company, and many
others. Id. at 1263–64.
93 Id. at 1022.
91
92
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ensure American dominance in globalizing markets.94 This
statist vision of industrial policy was unusually ambitious for
the time, reaching far beyond the more modest suggestions
of Gates’s fellow witnesses. As discussed in Part III,
however, the cooperative conception of the governmentbusiness relationship expressed in Gates’ proposals would
become a major feature of legislative efforts during the
Theodore Roosevelt Administration.
Although many additional witnesses—including among
others Archibald White, President of the National Salt
Company, Max Pam, general counsel for the American Steel
and Wire Company, and the pro-business publicist George
Gunton—also recommended federal chartering, support for
federalization before the commission was not unanimous. A
significant minority of witnesses opposed federal chartering.
William H. Moore, the successful trust promoter,95 believed
that while American corporate law should emulate the
English Companies Acts, replacing state with federal
legislation was both unnecessary and undesirable. According
to Moore, states with restrictive corporation laws would face
no choice but to liberalize, or else lose their domestic
corporations to permissive states such as New Jersey. This
prediction was similar to that of many anti-corporate
activists; the difference, of course, being that Moore
welcomed such a development.96 Similar testimony was
given by the corporate attorney Francis L. Stetson—a close
associate of J.P. Morgan and legal counsel to several Morgan
trusts—who also viewed a national corporation law as
unnecessary, as well as unconstitutional. In Stetson’s view,
even if the federal government had constitutional authority
to control corporations (which he doubted), regulation of
monopoly was best left to natural economic forces. In terms
strikingly similar to those of later free-market economists,
Id. at 1016–18.
Moore was involved in the creation of United States Steel and
several other large industrial combinations. See id. at 960–65; JOHN N.
INGHAM, BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BUSINESS LEADERS, at
959–60 (1983).
96 See id. at 994–96.
94
95
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Stetson reasoned that even if a corporation monopolized a
particular market (Stetson used the specific example of the
Havemeyer sugar trust), supracompetitive pricing would
naturally attract new competition, and the problem would
resolve itself without any need for government
involvement.97 Finally, John Dos Passos—another prominent
Wall Street attorney and, incidentally, counsel to the
Havemeyer sugar trust—also advised a hands-off approach
to the question of federal corporate law. According to Dos
Passos, issues of corporate governance were best left to
private decision making, into which federal legislation would
only constitute unhelpful interference. Quoting Edmund
Burke, Dos Passos admonished the federal government to
avoid involvement in private affairs—be they family,
business, or otherwise—unless its legal authority was
unambiguous and the policy necessity was overwhelming.98
Neither condition was satisfied in his conception of the
chartering issue. It should be noted that during the
Progressive Era, in which even members of the business
community often supported federal regulation, Dos Passos’s
(as well as Moore’s and Stetson’s) laissez-faire perspective
was a minority view. Interestingly, this perspective is highly
resonant with modern corporate legal scholarship,
illustrating, perhaps, that all things come around again in
time.
A final witness worthy of special note is James B. Dill,
the primary drafter of New Jersey’s permissive corporation
act. In light of his involvement with the New Jersey statute,
one might have expected Dill to oppose federal chartering
legislation. In fact, both in his testimony before the
Industrial Commission and in his published legal writing,
Dill was a strong supporter of federal incorporation. The
reason seems to have been his sincere belief in the liberal
principles of the English Companies Acts, which he had
endeavored to incorporate into the New Jersey statute. Dill
97 See id. at 980. Stetson would soon abandon this free-market
position, however, as he became deeply involved in federalization efforts
under the Roosevelt Administration. See infra Part III.
98 INDUSTR. COMM’N, PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 27, at 1162–63.
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was so convinced of the legal advantages of English law (and,
by extension, New Jersey law) that he called for its
implementation on a nationwide basis. During his testimony,
Dill passionately defended the New Jersey statute,
emphasizing its requirement that financial information be
made available to shareholders (a requirement that he
conceded was not always respected in practice),99 its
condition that stock be issued only in exchange for cash or
property,100 and its fair and predictable system of chartering
fees and taxes.101 In order to secure New Jersey’s advantages
for all corporations across the country, and to prohibit
discrimination on the part of more restrictive states, Dill
recommended that a liberal corporation law be enacted at
the federal level. According to Dill, federal legislation would
curb the worst of corporate abuses, while also providing
every corporation “the right to do as it sees fit” with respect
to internal governance.102
Dill’s advocacy of federal chartering was not limited to his
commission testimony. Three years later, Dill presented a
more detailed proposal before the Harvard Economics
Seminary.103 In his Harvard address, Dill set forth his
outline for a federal incorporation act meant to protect
corporations from the vagaries of state laws and ensure
minimum standards of publicity and capitalization. Like
many commentators, Dill believed that the states were
incapable of coordinating corporate law: The political and
financial
rewards
of
attacking
successful
foreign
corporations—or, alternatively, of attracting corporations
with overly permissive corporate laws—were far too great to
lead to convergence on optimal corporate governance
standards.104 Dill’s view, of course, was that the New Jersey
See id. at 1079.
Id. at 1080–81. This condition prohibited corporations from issuing
stock in exchange for services. It was actually a fairly restrictive provision,
even compared to other states at the time.
101 See id. at 1086–87.
102 Id. at 1087.
103 See Dill, supra note 50.
104 See id. at 278–95.
99

100
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standard was optimal, and his suggestions for drafting a
federal law traced the substance of the New Jersey act.
Specifically, Dill recommended legislation that would, inter
alia, (1) allow corporations the option of incorporating under
federal law (without expressly preempting state corporation
acts), (2) shield federally chartered corporations from state
lawsuits, regulation, and taxation, and (3) assure
corporations the privileges and immunities of natural
persons under the Constitution.105 Unlike anti-corporate
reformers who sought to limit the power of corporations, Dill
called upon the federal government to facilitate their
development.
As the testimony of these witnesses shows, the speakers
at the Chicago conference and the witnesses before the
Industrial Commission shared a common goal of federalizing
corporate law, but their political motivations were
fundamentally different. Anti-corporate populists such as
William Jennings Bryan saw federal legislation as the
solution to permissive state laws. Representatives of big
business, such as Rockefeller, Gates, and Dill, saw federal
legislation as the solution to restrictive state laws. Given
their very different political perspectives on the nature of the
corporation—a threat to economic freedom versus the engine
of economic progress—their hopes for legislation would prove
mutually incompatible.
Interestingly, nearly all commentators agreed on one
specific policy goal: disclosure of corporate financial
information to the government and/or the public. Among
anti-corporate reformers, “publicity” was widely viewed as a
safeguard against monopolistic pricing (though again, the
mechanism of this protection was rarely explained in detail).
To these commentators, shareholder protection was
generally not a major concern, though it was sometimes cited
as an additional benefit of corporate publicity. It was
actually corporatist figures, many of whom were corporate
insiders, who tended to take a greater interest in providing
information to investors. Even laissez-faire conservatives

105

Id. at 294.
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who opposed federal legislation entirely (John Dos Passos,
for example) often supported the general concept of
mandatory corporate disclosure.106 Why, one might ask,
would corporate insiders favor disclosure rules? The most
likely answer is that mandatory disclosure would help
sound, profitable corporations differentiate themselves in
financial markets from their lower-quality rivals. Those
firms able to credibly demonstrate their financial heath
would enjoy favorable access to securities markets and a
lower cost of capital. At the turn of the twentieth century,
the American stock market remained underdeveloped and
opaque. By reducing the information asymmetries between
corporations and outside investors, mandatory disclosure
could provide an advantage to well-governed corporations.107
Although this reasoning was not expressly articulated by any
witness before the Industrial Commission, many witnesses
made disparaging comments regarding unsound, illconceived corporations, reflecting not only the historical
reality that many corporations were entirely speculative, but
also the fact that more profitable firms were eager to
differentiate themselves.108
In the end, the Industrial Commission itself
recommended mandatory corporate publicity, even as it
declined to endorse federal incorporation. In its final report
to Congress, the commission took a moderate position on
federal legislation, recommending mandatory disclosure,
federal corporate taxation, and stronger federal antitrust
law, but advising against federal incorporation as too radical

106 INDUSTR. COMM’N, PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 27, at 1168–69.
Francis. L. Stetson and Elbert H. Gary (President of Federal Steel) also
favored corporate publicity. See Talk for Corporations: Stetson and Gary
Before the Industrial Commission, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 20, 1899, at 10.
107 For an analysis of information asymmetry in the early history of
the American stock market, see BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 53, at 189–
97, 305–11.
108 For just a few examples of these comments, see, e.g., INDUSTR.
COMM’N, PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 27, at 68-69, 586, 975–76, 997,
1070–74, 1154. Even James B. Dill admitted that many corporations were
formed for purely speculative purposes. Id. at 1079–81.
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a policy measure.109 According to the commission’s report,
not only were the practical advantages of federalization
uncertain, its political implications merited a cautious
legislative
approach.110
Although
the
commission
recommended against federalization in the near term, its
report allowed that, if more conservative measures proved
ineffective, federal chartering might yet prove necessary at
some point in the future.111 Indeed, further consideration of
the chartering issue would not be long in coming—over the
next decade, the federal incorporation question would play
an important role in national politics, moving from the realm
of abstract proposals to specific congressional legislation. But
as politicians grappled with how best to regulate national
businesses, the anti-corporate and corporatist perspectives
would continue to define the debate, ultimately preventing
any agreement on a federal incorporation law.

III. FEDERALIZATION EFFORTS DURING THE
ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION
The attention brought to the federal chartering issue by
the Chicago Conference on Trusts and the Industrial
Commission hearings (both of which were widely covered in
the national press) led to a number of legislative proposals
during the first decade of the twentieth century. As early as
1900, in the immediate wake of the Chicago conference,
Congress considered the first federal licensing bill, as well as
a constitutional amendment granting the federal
government general incorporation powers.112 Although
additional bills soon followed, chartering legislation did not
become politically viable until the active involvement of the
Roosevelt Administration. From the beginning of his
presidency (following the assassination of William
109 See INDUSTR. COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION 643–52 (1901).
110 See id. at 645.
111 See id.
112 H.R. 5756, 56th Cong. (1st Sess. 1900); H.R.J. Res. 138, 56th Cong.
(1st Sess. 1900). Neither proposal was successful.
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McKinley), regulation of big business was a major focus of
Roosevelt’s Administration, and as the years passed,
corporate law became increasingly central to his legislative
agenda. Despite his reputation as a trustbuster, Roosevelt
was in fact a decidedly “corporatist” progressive, viewing
large corporations as an essential feature of modern
economic life, to be attacked by government if and only if
they abused their economic power. Over the course of his
presidency, Roosevelt sought a cooperative relationship
between the government and large corporations, to be
managed by an empowered federal executive.113 This vision
was in direct conflict with that of many populist Democrats,
who feared any concentration of economic power, even (and
perhaps especially) if controlled by the federal government.
Thus, the stage was set for continued disagreement over the
direction of corporate law, as the corporatist agenda of the
Roosevelt Administration clashed with the populist concerns
of the Democratic opposition (as well as the “insurgent” wing
of the Republican party itself). In the end, despite
Republican control of both houses of Congress for all of
Roosevelt’s presidency, not one of the federal chartering bills
proposed during his Administration would pass.

A. Roosevelt’s Early Approach to Corporations
While perhaps more conservative than the most
ambitious reformers of the Progressive Era, Roosevelt was in
many ways the quintessential progressive, deeply committed
to social progress and confident in the abilities of
government. Following his sudden ascension to the
presidency in September 1901, Roosevelt became the leader,
not only of the United States, but also of the Republican
Party’s legislative and regulatory agenda. Motivated by his
personal belief in the government’s competence to regulate
the market, encouraged by the pro-regulation views of many
leading businessmen, and pressured by the antitrust rhetoric
of his Democratic opponents, Roosevelt embarked on an
113 For a detailed history of the Roosevelt Administration’s
perspective on corporate regulation, see generally SKLAR, supra note 16.
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extended effort to establish federal regulation of
corporations. This effort, which initially focused on publicity,
would soon lead to the creation of the federal Bureau of
Corporations, an agency tasked with studying and
(potentially) supervising interstate corporations. As
discussed in Section III.B below, the Bureau would reinforce
Roosevelt’s increasingly ambitious regulatory goals,
eventually leading to his direct support for federal chartering
legislation.
In the early years of his presidency, prior to the creation
of the Bureau of Corporations, Roosevelt faced strong
antitrust sentiment from the American public and calls from
leading Democrats to substantially limit corporate power.
William Jennings Bryan had been the Democratic
presidential candidate in 1900, and the Democratic platform
called for legislation similar to Bryan’s licensing
proposals.114 Although Bryan lost the election, his calls for
stricter corporate law retained considerable public appeal, all
the more so as the Great Merger Movement continued.
Federal chartering was not just a partisan issue, moreover,
pro-business publications such as the Wall Street Journal
strongly favored federal incorporation115 and the
constitutional amendment effort in 1900 had been led by
Republicans.116 These pressures, combined with Roosevelt’s
personal belief in the need for federal business regulation,
ensured that corporate law would be an important feature of
his Administration’s agenda.
In his first message to Congress in December 1901,
Roosevelt struck a cautious tone on the subject of corporate
legislation, while at the same time outlining policy proposals

114 Democratic Party Platform of 1900 (July 4, 1900), in AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, eds., 2017),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29587 [perma.cc/G3GYK749].
115 See, e.g., The Needed Reform: A Federal Law for Corporations,
WALL ST. J., May 23, 1904, at 2; Federal Laws for Corporations, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 12, 1903, at 1; Proposed National Incorporations, WALL ST. J., Feb.
21, 1903, at 1.
116 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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that would later appear in specific bills. Implicitly criticizing
populist reformers, Roosevelt warned that attacking the
trusts would weaken American industry, especially relative
to the European powers with which the United States was
increasingly competitive. Roosevelt reserved particular scorn
for those who opposed all concentrated wealth, proclaiming
that their broad denouncements of industrial combinations
“appeal especially to hatred and fear . . . precisely the two
emotions, particularly when combined with ignorance, which
unfit men for the exercise of cool and steady judgment.”117
Rather than destroy large corporations, Roosevelt argued
that “combination and concentration should be, not
prohibited, but supervised and within reasonable limits
controlled.”118
Roosevelt’s proposals for effecting this control were
threefold. The first was corporate publicity, a goal with
broad, bipartisan support. Roosevelt called for the federal
government to “inspect and examine” corporations—rather
than requiring corporations to disclose information to the
public.119 The second proposal addressed the “utter lack of
uniformity in the State laws” by recommending that the
federal government “assume power of supervision and
regulation over all corporations doing an interstate
business.”120 Roosevelt claimed this would not constitute
“interfering with the power of the States in the matter
itself,”121 but this proposal would evolve into more intrusive
efforts during Roosevelt’s second term. Finally, given the
increasingly national scope of the economy, Roosevelt
recommended creation of a cabinet-level Department of
Commerce and Industries. Although Roosevelt left the exact
responsibilities of this new department unspecified, its
117 Theodore Roosevelt, First Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1901), in
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, eds.,
2017),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29542
[perma.cc/L3ZK-PS96].
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
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authority would include “all matters affecting the great
business corporations.”122
Roosevelt’s perspective—that large corporations were
socially beneficial if properly regulated by the federal
government—was compatible with that of many business
leaders. On the other hand, Roosevelt had little sympathy for
laissez-faire conservatism. In an address to the Boston
business community in August 1902, Roosevelt sharpened
his case for regulation by criticizing those who opposed
federal action. In his speech, Roosevelt admitted it was often
difficult to precisely identify corporate evils, but criticized
wealthy conservatives “who deny that the evils exist.”123
This criticism ran parallel to the President’s emerging
distinction between “good” and “bad” trusts—that is, “good”
trusts cooperated with government regulation, while “bad”
trusts attempted to oppose it.124 In reality, Roosevelt was
probably less concerned with any “evils” of corporations than
with the risk that lack of government action could fuel
support for socialism.125 Roosevelt thus struck a careful
balance in denouncing “destructive” or “radical” legislative
proposals, while at the same time meeting the public’s
demand for some form of federal control.
This balance between economic practicality and corporate
accountability was well received by the American public.126
Although Roosevelt’s proposals were not immune from
criticism, few observers fundamentally opposed federal

122
123

Id.
One Law for All, Says Roosevelt, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 25, 1902,

at 1.
124 The upshot of this distinction was that the federal government
could cooperate with publically-responsible “good” trusts, while legal
action should be reserved for publically-abusive “bad” trusts. For
discussion of Roosevelt’s attitudes toward trusts, see KOLKO, supra note
16, at 127–32.
125 This concern was a common theme in Roosevelt’s approach to
business regulation.
126 See Country Backs Roosevelt in Trust Fight, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct.
11, 1901, at 1.
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supervision.127 Unsurprisingly, populist Democrats such as
William Jennings Bryan criticized the President for being
soft on trusts,128 but nearly all concerned accepted the
inevitability of federal corporate regulation.129 While specific
questions of scope and emphasis remained subject to debate,
the broader necessity of federal law was not itself
controversial.
In fact, even as the Roosevelt Administration was
working on its own proposals, the 57th Congress was already
considering several corporate regulatory bills. In late 1901,
for example, Representative Charles Littlefield (R-ME)
introduced legislation that would have imposed extensive
publicity requirements on newly-formed corporations.130
Littlefield’s bill found inspiration in both the Chicago
Conference on Trusts and the Industrial Commission, as well
as in Roosevelt’s calls for corporate regulation. Littlefield
endorsed the view, expressed repeatedly at the Chicago
Conference on Trusts, that publicity was a powerful weapon
against inflated dividends and monopolistic pricing.131 With
respect to the Industrial Commission hearings, Littlefield
cited the testimony of both John D. Rockefeller and James B.
Dill in support of corporate publicity.132 When the House
Judiciary Committee reported Littlefield’s bill, the
committee emphasized that many states had inadequate
publicity requirements and that remedial action would be
most effective if taken at the federal level.133 The Democratic
minority, while also supporting corporate publicity, criticized
127 Cf. Mr. Roosevelt and the Corporations, INDEP., Dec. 17, 1903
(reporting that Roosevelt’s approach was disfavored by certain
industrialists as hostile to capital).
128 See Mr. Cockran Welcomed by Tammany’s Hosts, N.Y. TIMES, July
5, 1902, at 2; Bryan in Johnson Circus: Nebraskan Speaks in Ohioan’s
Tent at Toledo, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 14, 1902, at 5; Trusts Called Foes of
People, CHI. DAILY TRIB., July 19, 1903, at 7.
129 See, e.g., Joseph Auerbach, President Roosevelt and the Trusts, 175
N. AM. REV. 877, 878 (1902).
130 See H.R. 17, 57th Cong. (2d Sess. 1901).
131 See H.R. REP. NO. 57-3375, pt. 1, at 22–23, 25 (1903).
132 Id. at 2–6. See also THORELLI, supra note 51, at 538–39.
133 H.R. REP. NO. 57-3375, pt. 1, at 17–19 (1903).

HUTCHISON – FINAL

No. 3:1017] PROGRESSIVE ERA CONCEPTIONS OF THE CORPORATION

1057

Republicans’ casting it as a panacea for the trust problem.
The Democrats on the Judiciary Committee called for
stronger limits on corporate power, including automatic
bankruptcy proceedings against overcapitalized corporations,
confiscation of goods shipped in violation of the antitrust
laws, and, perhaps most importantly, an end to the
protective tariff.134 Despite their misgivings, however, the
Democratic minority recommended passage. Ironically, the
Littlefield bill proved too strict for conservative
Republicans—the legislation passed the House, but Senate
Republicans refused to vote on it.
From the Democratic perspective, Representative Ashton
C. Shallenberger (D-NE) introduced more ambitious
legislation in 1901.135 His bill provided for the creation of a
“Foreign and Internal Commerce Commission,” similar in
structure to the Interstate Commerce Commission created in
1887.136 This proposed commission would have had the
power to grant (and withhold) federal charters.137 The
commission would enforce the charter system by taxing the
capital stock of corporations that engaged in interstate
business without obtaining a federal charter.138 Like the
Littlefield proposal, Shallenberger’s bill would have also
imposed disclosure requirements on chartered firms. More so
than Littlefield, however, Shallenberger was explicit as to
whom this disclosure was meant to protect, investors not
being among them. Alleging that dividends on watered stock
enriched shareholders and increased prices for consumers,
Shallenberger disclaimed any concern for the economic
interests of investors. In his view, it was wholly incumbent

H.R. REP. NO. 57-3375, pt. 2, at 4–6 (1903).
H.R. 6521, 57th Cong. (1st Sess. 1901).
136 Id.
137 Id. § 5. In the bill’s original text, the legal significance of this
federal charter was unclear. Shallenberger was apologetic regarding the
imprecisions in his bill, emphasizing that he was “not a lawyer.” Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Trust Legis. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
57th Cong. 17, 24 (1902) [hereinafter Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Trust Legislation] (statement of Rep. Ashton Shallenberger).
138 H.R. 6521 § 7.
134
135
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upon investors themselves to investigate securities before
they purchased them.139 Shallenberger’s bill stalled and died
in the Republican-controlled House Judiciary Committee,
but his attitude toward investor protection was common
among lawmakers at the time. During the early twentieth
century, corporate disclosure was often viewed as a remedy
for excessive profits and was, therefore, framed in implicit
tension with the economic interests of shareholders.
The
Littlefield
and
Shallenberger
bills
were
representative of early chartering proposals. Essentially the
products of individual Congressmen, they reflected the
widely-felt need for federal action, but lacked the
cohesiveness of a broader legislative program. This political
dynamic changed with the creation of the Bureau of
Corporations, which used its investigative powers to develop
a more organized legislative agenda. The Bureau’s
recommendations—supported by the prestige and authority
of the President—would take a central role in political
debates over federal chartering legislation.

B. The Bureau of Corporations
The Department of Commerce and Labor, proposed by
Roosevelt upon taking office, was finally established by
congressional legislation in February 1903.140 Pursuant to
discussions
between
Roosevelt
and
congressional
Republicans, the department included within it a specialized
Bureau of Corporations, tasked with investigating the
business practices of corporations in interstate commerce.141
139 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Trust Legislation, supra note
137, at 22–23 (statement of Rep. Ashton Shallenberger).
140 An Act to Establish the Department of Commerce and Labor, ch.
552, 32 Stat. 825 (1903). Roosevelt’s original proposal had referred to a
Department of Commerce and Industries, the authority of which would
include “among many other things whatever concerns labor.” Theodore
Roosevelt, First Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1901), in AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, eds., 2017),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29542 [perma.cc/S4HGUVC8].
141 § 6, 32 Stat. at 828.
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The Bureau’s mandate reflected the view that publicity was
central to corporate regulation. Specifically, the Bureau was
empowered to make “diligent investigation into the
organization, conduct, and management of the business of
any corporation, joint stock company or corporate
combination” and to report its findings to the President for
the purpose of recommending legislation.142 Consistent with
the Administration’s evolving regulatory agenda, these
recommendations would soon include direct federal
supervision.
Roosevelt’s own regulatory philosophy—marked by a
strong belief in executive power—was closely interwoven into
the very creation of the Bureau. As originally drafted, the
legislation creating the Bureau defined its publication
responsibilities broadly, requiring the Bureau to make its
findings publicly available.143 When the legislation reached
the conference committee, however, Senator Knute Nelson
(R-MN), acting at Roosevelt’s behest, introduced an
amendment requiring the Bureau to report its findings
directly to the President. The President would then, using
his executive discretion, determine whether to make such
information available to the public.144 This change reflected
three characteristics of Roosevelt’s approach to corporations.
First, by placing the Bureau’s investigative findings under
the direct control of the President, it accorded with
Roosevelt’s expansive view of presidential authority. Second,
by granting the President the practical option to either act
on the Bureau’s findings or keep them private (depending on
the particular firm), it was consistent with Roosevelt’s
political distinction between “good” and “bad” industrial
trusts.145 Finally, by preventing the Bureau itself from
releasing its findings to the public, it underscored the fact
that disclosure to investors was not one of the
Administration’s priorities.

142
143
144
145

Id.
THORELLI, supra note 51, at 552.
Id. at 553–54.
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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Pursuant to the final version of the act, the Bureau was
led by a Commissioner of Corporations appointed by (and
reporting to) the President.146 The Bureau’s first
Commissioner was James R. Garfield (son of the late
President James A. Garfield), a friend and advisor to
President Roosevelt who shared many of his views on
corporate regulation. Garfield envisioned the Bureau taking
an active role in investigating corporations, but also believed
that its central mission was to “cooperate with, not
antagonize, the business world.”147 During its first year of
existence, the Bureau embarked on an ambitious research
program that included a thorough study of state
legislation.148 The conclusions Garfield drew from this
study—that differences among state corporation laws
amounted to legal “anarchy,” that states’ attempts to
regulate corporations had been “unequal and disastrous,”
and that state competition to attract corporate charters was
no less than “thoroughly vicious”—led naturally to
recommendations for federalizing corporate law.149
Based on its findings, the Bureau recommended that the
federal government assume authority over corporations by
requiring all corporations in interstate commerce to receive
and maintain a federal license.150 In the Bureau’s 1904
report, Garfield rejected the possibility that the states could
reform corporate law themselves, stating that it was
“obviously impossible that forty-five jurisdictions should
agree on anything like a uniform system in so important a
matter.”151 Having dismissed state action, the report
discussed the possibility of direct federal incorporation.
Although Garfield believed the federal government could
constitutionally incorporate firms active in interstate
§ 6, 32 Stat. at 828.
See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE & LABOR, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS, H.R. DOC. NO. 58-165, at 36 (3d Sess.
1904) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS].
148 Id. at 16–42.
149 Id. at 37–40, 46.
150 Id. at 44–48.
151 Id. at 44.
146
147
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commerce—and, conversely, could bar firms not so
incorporated from interstate commerce—he was less
confident that Congress had power over firms engaged
purely in manufacturing.152 Thus, while Garfield considered
federal incorporation a promising method of regulation, he
worried that it was overly fraught with constitutional
uncertainties. The approach that Garfield more strongly
recommended, and that the Administration eventually
proposed, was the substantively similar option of
comprehensive federal licensing.
Although not federal incorporation per se, the Bureau of
Corporation’s licensing proposal was similar in substance. As
set forth in the Bureau’s 1904 report, any corporation
engaged in interstate commerce would be required to
maintain a federal license. Receipt of this license would be
conditioned on two requirements: (1) providing the
government with “reports and returns” regarding business
and financial information, and (2) satisfaction of “all
necessary requirements as to corporate organization and
management.”153 This second condition meant that the
federal government could dictate corporate governance
standards, even if state law remained nominally intact. In its
report, the Bureau proposed that the licensing system leave
only local matters to the states—e.g., protecting health and
welfare, adjudicating commercial contracts, and all matters
concerning real property. Federal control over corporate
governance was made even more explicit in an appendix,
which outlined the Bureau’s plans for future legislation in
detail. In addition to providing “reports and returns,”
licensed corporations would be required to conform their
capitalization, management structure, and even commercial
business practices to federal standards.154 Taken as a whole,

152 REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 147, at
44–45. Although essentially nonexistent today, the constitutional
distinction between “commerce” and “intrastate manufacturing” was an
important (and controversial) issue during the Progressive Era.
153 Id. at 45.
154 Id. at 56–60.
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the Bureau’s licensing proposal was federal incorporation by
another name.
Even before the release of the Bureau’s report, Roosevelt
announced his strong support for the direction of the
Bureau’s work. Roosevelt argued that in an era of national
industry, federal legislation was a matter of common sense.
Free from the political pressures of interstate competition,
federal law was uniquely capable of transcending the race
toward “easy terms,” while at the same time avoiding any
harmful expression of “intemperate, destructive, or
demagogic spirit.”155 In his praise of “moderation, good
sense, the earnest desire to avoid doing any damage,”
Roosevelt’s stance on corporations was consistent with his
broader economic philosophy156: Concentrated wealth, in and
of itself, was inevitable in industrial society and should be
limited by government if and only if it were used to the
detriment of the general public.157 As Roosevelt saw it,
“[g]reat corporations are necessary, and only men of great
and singular mental power can manage such corporations
successfully, and such men must have great rewards.”158 At
the same time, however, he also believed that “corporations
should be managed with due regard to the interest of the
public as a whole.”159 Without specifically endorsing the
Bureau’s proposal (which had not yet been published),
Roosevelt expressed confidence that the Bureau had struck
the correct political balance, seeking as it did to regulate “by
co-operation, not antagonism; by making constructive
legislation, not destructive prosecution.”160 Agreeing with
Garfield’s position that state law was inadequate, but that
federal legislation should also be “cooperative” and
155 Theodore Roosevelt, Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1904), in
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, eds.,
2017),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29545
[perma.cc/NYS8-DNFD].
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
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“constructive,”161 Roosevelt appeared fully prepared to
support the Bureau’s recommendations.
Once these recommendations were actually made public,
however, Roosevelt was slow to commit to any specific
regulatory
structure.162
Although
he
consistently
recommended that Congress pass some form of corporate
law, he tended to emphasize the need for legislation rather
than its specific details. In his 1905 annual address to
Congress, Roosevelt stressed that national corporations
could only be effectively controlled by the national
government. He urged that legislation be passed “in some
manner which the wisdom of the Congress may suggest,”
without addressing the specific form (incorporation,
licensing, or otherwise) he thought such legislation should
take.163 Although he criticized “negative” antitrust
prohibitions
and
advocated
their replacement by
“affirmative” regulation, Roosevelt was not yet ready to
propose specific legislation of his own, and seemed to prefer
further deliberation before committing to any reform
program.164
This lack of urgency was partly due to the ongoing
regulatory activity of the Bureau itself, which had already
entered into “constructive” agreements with many of the
nation’s largest trusts.165 Behind the scenes, Garfield had
entered into investigative relationships with several major
corporations that were willing to share internal records in
exchange for deferring stricter antitrust enforcement. These
informal relationships were suggestive of how a formal
licensing system would have worked in practice. Between

161 See REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS, supra note
147, at 13–14.
162 The recommendations were published in U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE
& LABOR, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS (1905).
163 Theodore Roosevelt, Fifth Annual Message (Dec. 5, 1905), in
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, eds.,
2017),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29546
[perma.cc/RH5Q-PAEZ].
164 Id.
165 See KOLKO, supra note 16, at 79–87.
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1904 and 1906, the Bureau entered into agreements with a
number of major corporations that allowed it to receive
access to internal business and financial records. In return,
the cooperating corporations were protected from antitrust
enforcement; if the Bureau determined that a disclosing
corporation was in violation of federal law, it would warn
management in advance, allowing the firm to alter its
practices and avoid formal enforcement action.166 The
Bureau entered into many of these agreements with firms
controlled by J.P. Morgan & Co., with which the
Administration had cordial relations and whose companies
were therefore considered “good” trusts. Only firms that
failed to cooperate with the Administration were considered
“bad” trusts. Constructive supervision, rather than legal
enforcement, was the ideal. As Garfield described the
Bureau’s activities, a “policy of obtaining heavy cooperation
rather than arousing the antagonism of business and
industrial interests has been followed.”167
One can imagine that a licensing system would have been
used in similar fashion—as a protective shield for “good”
trusts and as political leverage against “bad” trusts. In any
case, though it was already engaged in informal regulation,
the Bureau remained committed to the enactment of a
formal licensing system. In his reports of 1905 and 1906,
Garfield reiterated the need for formal licensing legislation,
emphasizing the advantages of “preventive rather than
remedial” law.168 Other members of the Administration
echoed this emphasis until Roosevelt himself finally
endorsed licensing in late 1906. In his annual address to
Congress, Roosevelt affirmed that the time had come for
federal control over business corporations, and that such
control be implemented “by a national license law or in other
166 Id. at 74–76; SKLAR, supra note 16, at 187-92; WIEBE, supra note
15, at 45–47.
167 See KOLKO, supra note 16, at 75.
168 See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE & LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS 7–9 (1905); U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE &
LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS 5–7
(1906).

HUTCHISON – FINAL

No. 3:1017] PROGRESSIVE ERA CONCEPTIONS OF THE CORPORATION

1065

fashion.”169 Consistent with his broader economic outlook,
Roosevelt called for preventing the evils of the minority of
abusive corporations, while protecting the business and legal
environment for the majority of beneficial corporations.
Sounding a familiar chord, Roosevelt cast corporate licensing
as the safest defense against socialism, which he warned
could be easily inflamed by unchecked corporate excess.170
Roosevelt chastised business magnates who resisted
government regulation, proclaiming “it is these reactionaries
and ultraconservatives who are themselves most potent in
increasing socialistic feeling.”171 As evidenced by his abiding
concern for defusing the threat of socialism, Roosevelt saw
federal regulation as a means of protecting all corporate
stakeholders, including labor, consumers, and even
capitalists themselves.172
Roosevelt’s most forceful call for regulation came in late
1907, when he argued in support of a major chartering bill
drafted in part by the Bureau of Corporations.173 Repeating
themes from earlier addresses, including the “ineffective
chaos” of state corporate law, Roosevelt laid even stronger
emphasis on the need for a federal solution.174 Endorsing the
Bureau’s proposals, the President recommended a licensing
system combining (1) publicity, (2) securities regulation, and
(3) a broad prohibition of “unhealthy competition” (including
price discrimination, predatory pricing, and exclusive
dealing requirements).175 In keeping with Roosevelt’s
corporatist outlook, however, combinations and pricing
169 Theodore Roosevelt, Sixth Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1906), in
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, eds.,
2017),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29547
[perma.cc/35WB-K6K3].
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 This legislation is discussed in detail in Section III.C, infra.
174 Theodore Roosevelt, Seventh Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1907), in
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, eds.,
2017),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29548
[perma.cc/9HEC-2BBZ].
175 Id.
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agreements would be permitted, so long as they were
approved by the federal government.176
The Administration’s proposals received a wide range of
political responses. Many of the nation’s major newspapers
supported federal chartering, as did smaller, more
specialized
publications
catering
to
the
business
177
community.
Notably, the editorial board of the Wall Street
Journal consistently supported the Administration’s plans.
In several editorials, the Journal argued that federal
legislation in the form proposed by the President would help,
not hinder, American corporations.178 Many anti-corporate
political figures, including William Jennings Bryan, agreed
with this assessment. They considered it an argument
against the President’s proposals, however, given their
distrust of corporate power.179 From yet another perspective,
many corporatist reformers who supported federal
chartering nonetheless found the Administration’s proposals
overly restrictive. For example, James B. Dill, who continued

Id.
See, e.g., Opinion, Corporation Oversight, N.Y. TRIB., Dec. 22, 1904,
at 6; Opinion, Mr. Garfield and the Corporations, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 24,
1904 (aggregating other newspapers’ opinions on federal corporate
legislation); Opinion, Conservative, Not Radical, DULUTH NEWS-TRIB., Jan.
8, 1905; John C. Richberg, Opinion, Need of a National Incorporation Law,
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 30, 1906, at B5; Opinion, Shortsighted Leaders, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 1907, § 2, at 4; Opinion, Federal Corporations, PLAIN
DEALER, June 3, 1908 (summarizing business support for federal
incorporation); Opinion, Federal Incorporation, OHIO STATE J., June 16,
1908.
178 See, e.g., Opinion, Federal Incorporations, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19,
1904, at 1; Opinion, Federal Incorporations or Licenses, WALL ST. J., Dec.
22, 1904, at 1; National Regulation of Corporations, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18,
1905, at 1; Opinion, The Nation and the States, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1907,
at 1; Opinion, Federal Incorporations, WALL ST. J., May 28, 1908.
179 Bryan (who was preparing to run for President in 1908) emerged
as a major critic of the Administration’s proposals, which he warned would
emasculate vigorous state regulations. This position was somewhat ironic
given that Bryan had long supported federal licensing. See Opinion,
Attacks Idea of President, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1907, at 12; Opinion, Bryan
Opposed to Roosevelt’s Plan, BALTIMORE AM., Oct. 11, 1907; Opinion, Bryan
the Star at Peoria Show, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 10, 1908, at 4.
176
177
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to
support
federal
incorporation,
felt
that
the
Administration’s proposals would place undue burdens on
national firms. Dill preferred that federal chartering be
optional for corporations, allowing them to remain under
permissive state statutes (such as that of New Jersey) if they
chose.180 Finally, a minority of conservative commentators
opposed federal legislation entirely. The editorial board of
the New York Times, one of the most conservative major
newspapers of the era, consistently represented this
position.181
Each of these perspectives would play a role in the
looming battle over federal chartering, a political conflict
which would reach its height in the final years of the
Roosevelt presidency. As Roosevelt pushed for federal
legislation near the end of his second term, he faced an ironic
political situation: Nearly all major political interests
supported federal chartering, but disagreed as to the
fundamental goals that chartering legislation was meant to
accomplish. Anti-corporate reformers, represented by Bryan
Democrats, sought to strictly constrain all large corporations
and therefore distrusted the Administration’s plans for
supervising (and protecting) “good” trusts. Corporatist
reformers, for their part, sought to empower corporations,
but were also beginning to grow suspicious of Roosevelt’s
ambitious regulatory agenda. As the Administration tried to
shepherd corporate legislation through Congress, Roosevelt
would eventually alienate both sides. Even though his own
approach sought to empower large corporations, his
increasingly interventionist stance alarmed conservatives as
well as Democrats. In the end, the Administration would fail

180 Opinion, For Federal Franchise, but Optional—J. B. Dill, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 1904, at 5; Opinion, SPRINGFIELD DAILY REPUBLICAN
(Springfield, Mass.), Dec. 24, 1904, at 6; Opinion, Dill on the Garfield
Report: His View of Federal Franchises, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 1904, at 2.
Dill moderated his opposition to the Administration’s proposals after
becoming a judge of the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals in 1905.
181 See, e.g., Opinion, State or Federal Control?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27,
1904, at 6; Opinion, Groping for Remedies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1907, at 6;
Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1907, at 8.
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to navigate the political hazards in Congress and would run
aground between the anti-corporate and corporatist reform
positions.

C. The Hepburn Bill
Late in Roosevelt’s second term, as the President and the
Bureau of Corporations pressed the case for federal
chartering, several licensing, registration, and incorporation
bills were introduced in Congress. The most important of
these proposals—supported by much of the business reform
community—was the so-called “Hepburn Bill,” which was
drafted by the Roosevelt Administration in close cooperation
with business interests and introduced in Congress by
Administration-ally Representative William Hepburn (R-IA).
Among the many federal chartering bills introduced during
this period, the Hepburn Bill initially appeared the most
likely to become law. Once in Congress, however, the bill
foundered in the committee process, as the various interests
supporting the legislation divided over its core provisions.
Representing the Progressive Era’s most serious attempt at
chartering legislation, the history of the bill provides a
telling example of the difficulties of corporate reform.
As the Administration was intensifying calls for corporate
legislation, private interests were also exploring the
potential advantages of federal law. In October 1907, the
National Civic Federation (the “NCF”) held a “National
Conference on Trusts and Combinations” to develop private
opinion on government responses to the trust issue.182 The
NCF was the organizational successor to the Civic
Federation of Chicago, and at the National Conference on
Trusts and Combinations (also held in Chicago) it
consciously revisited the issues addressed at the Chicago
Conference on Trusts in 1899. Since the original conference
had never issued an official policy position, and new
momentum for corporate legislation seemed to be building in
Washington, the second conference was seen as an
182 See PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS AND
COMBINATIONS (Nat’l Civic Fed’n ed., 1908) (hereinafter PROCEEDINGS).
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opportunity for businesses to express their policy views to
hopefully influence the substantive content of any
forthcoming legislation. Like the first conference, most
participants at the second conference advocated corporate
regulatory reform, with many recommending some form of
direct federal chartering. This time, however, the
recommendations leaned toward the corporatist perspective,
due to a narrower curation of political views on the part of
the NCF. Hoping to avoid the inconclusive outcome of the
1899 conference, the NCF leadership abandoned the goal of
ideological diversity and instead ensured that most invitees
generally supported pro-business regulation.183 Due in part
to this ideological cohesiveness, the Chicago conference had a
significant influence on the Roosevelt Administration’s
policymaking efforts: Following the conference, the NCF
would become directly involved in the legislative drafting
process, and positions expressed during the conference
proceedings would be incorporated into the bill itself.184
Although the conference was marked by broad support for
federal legislation, the specific form such legislation should
take remained subject to dispute. Federal chartering—
whether licensing or incorporation—was specifically called
for by several conferees, but different speakers had different
conceptions of what federal chartering would specifically
accomplish. Representative Henry W. Palmer (R-PA), who
spoke at the Chicago conference in support of optional
federal incorporation, exemplified the corporatist view.
Although Palmer did not call for the preemption of state law,
he believed that if a federal alternative became available,
most firms would choose federal law to avoid the
“limitations, exactions, and annoyances imposed on them by
the states.”185 Approvingly citing the English Companies
Acts, Palmer maintained that “proper regulation and

SKLAR, supra note 16, at 208-09.
See infra notes 197–204 and accompanying text.
185 Representative Henry W. Palmer, Federal Incorporation, Address
to the National Conference on Trusts and Combinations (Oct. 24, 1907), in
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 182, at 351, 361.
183
184
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control” should entail no hostility to honest business.186 The
investment banker Edwin Seligman (brother to the famous
public finance economist, Edwin R. A. Seligman) took a
similar view. Federal incorporation, he maintained, would be
“desirable in the interests of the corporations themselves.”187
Seligman believed that a federal statute would “protect such
companies as remain within the law and would defend them
from harassment by forty-five separate legislatures.”188
Finally, the Administration’s views were represented by
Herbert Knox Smith, who had recently succeeded Garfield as
Commissioner of Corporations.189 Smith argued that federal
legislation would solve the many problems of the state-law
system, which was “a chaos of conflicting legal conditions
resulting in inefficiency and uncertainty.”190 According to
Smith, a centralized body of uniform law would facilitate
industrial cooperation, allowing business and government to
work together to further national prosperity.191
Not everyone at the conference shared Smith’s optimistic
vision, however. Certain conference participants, while not
actively hostile to corporations, were less sanguine as to the
policy benefits of protecting them under federal law. Wade
Ellis, the Attorney General of Ohio (one of the stricter
186

Id. at 361–62. Palmer’s position was similar to that of James B.

Dill.
187 Edwin Seligman, The Trust Problem, Address to the National
Conference on Trusts and Combinations (Oct. 23, 1907), in PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 182, at 159, 164.
188 Id. at 165. Note that Seligman also believed that certain state laws
were overly permissive, however.
189 Roosevelt appointed Garfield to be Secretary of the Interior in
1907. Knox had served as Garfield’s deputy at the Bureau of Corporations
and shared many of Garfield’s regulatory views. If anything, Knox was
even friendlier with the trusts, expanding his predecessor’s informal
investigative relationships. See KOLKO, supra note 16, at 117–22; SKLAR,
supra note 16, at 186–88; WIEBE, BUSINESSMEN AND REFORM, supra note
15, at 47.
190 Herbert Knox Smith, Comm’r of Corps., Administrative Regulation
of Corporations, Address to the National Conference on Trusts and
Combinations (Oct. 24, 1907), in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 182, at 288,
296.
191 Id. at 294–95.
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corporate law jurisdictions), called for Congress to impose
minimum standards on interstate corporations. Absent such
standards, Ellis predicted a race to the bottom among
chartermongering states. His primary grievance was
intercorporate stockholding—freely allowed by New Jersey—
which Ellis believed should be universally prohibited by the
federal government.192 Bartlett Tripp, a prominent attorney
from South Dakota, also argued that federal law should
bring corporations under stricter control. Although he
conceded the inevitability of large combinations of capital
(“[t]he little red shop around the corner has gone out of
business forever”), Tripp believed that existing laws placed
inadequate limits on corporate power.193 He warned, “The
means that have brought us wealth and the luxuries of life
[i.e., corporations] must not become instruments of
oppression and tyranny.”194 One of the few judges at the
conference, Judge Peter Grosscup of the Seventh Circuit
struck a populist note in his convention comments. Arguing
for federal regulation, Grosscup claimed that several state
governments allowed the formation of corporations without
any oversight whatsoever: “Put your nickel in the slot and
take out a charter,” as he described the incorporation
process.195

192 Wade H. Ellis, Attorney Gen. of Ohio, Present Principles
Enunciated by the New Organization of Attorneys-General, Address to the
National Conference on Trusts and Combinations (Oct. 22, 1907), in
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 182, at 41.
193 Bartlett Tripp, Powers of the State and Nation over Corporations
and Trusts, Address to the National Conference on Trusts and
Combinations (Oct. 22, 1907), in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 182, at 128,
136–38.
194 Id. at 137.
195 Peter S. Grosscup, Judge, U.S. Circuit Court, Anti-Trust Laws,
Address to the National Conference on Trusts and Combinations (Oct. 23,
1907), in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 182, at 221, 227. Ironically, Grosscup
was well known as a pro-business judicial figure, having issued several
injunctions against striking labor unions, most notably during the
Pullman strike. Richard Hofstadter describes Grosscup as a jurist of
“impeccable conservatism.” See HOFSTADTER, supra note 15, at 222–24.
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Notwithstanding the occasional instance of anti-corporate
populism, the majority of participants at the Chicago
conference expressed relatively corporatist views. This loose
consensus was reflected in the conference’s formal
resolutions, which went further in recommending federal
legislation than the noncommittal resolutions of 1899. Even
the 1907 resolutions were relatively cautious, however, being
limited to the creation of a federal commission to study and
recommend corporate reform. Specifically, the resolutions
advised Congress to consider, by way of a federal
commission: (1) allowing railroads to cooperatively agree on
“reasonable” freight and passenger rates (subject to approval
from the Interstate Commerce Commission); (2) removing
labor unions and agricultural collectives from the
prohibitions of the Sherman Act; (3) removing business
combinations and industrial agreements “in the public
interest” from the prohibitions of the Sherman Act; (4)
enacting a corporate licensing or direct incorporation law;
and (5) requiring corporate disclosure to the Department of
Commerce and Labor.196
Despite the conference’s recommendation that these
issues be studied by a government commission, key figures
within the NCF sought to bypass this intermediate step and
push for federal legislation immediately. Given the
(seemingly) broad consensus at the conference and the
supportive attitude of the Roosevelt Administration, NCF
leaders believed the time was right for the passage of a
federal chartering law. Seth Low and Ralph Easely, the
NCF’s president and founder, respectively, sought to push
forward an activist version of the conference’s resolutions.197
In cooperation with Herbert Knox Smith of the Bureau of
Corporations (who had spoken at the conference himself),
Low, Easley, and other NCF members began preliminary
work on a chartering bill. The timing seemed fortuitous—
congressional Republicans had indicated their support and
several major industrialists had signaled their receptiveness

196
197

PROCEEDINGS, supra note 182, at 453–56.
See SKLAR, supra note 16, at 228-29.
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to the President. In early 1908, drafting work began in
earnest on what would become the Hepburn Bill.198
The drafting process soon became a highly collaborative
effort, which included a range of representatives from
business, government, and organized labor. Key contributors
included business figures with strong corporatist
sensibilities. Most notably, J.P. Morgan associates George W.
Perkins, Francis L. Stetson, and Victor Morawetz were all
closely
involved
in
the
drafting
process.
Other
representatives of big business who consulted on the bill
included Elbert H. Gary, Edgar Addison Bancroft, August
Belmont, Isaac Seligman, and James Speyer (all members of
the NCF and supporters of federal chartering).199 Gary and
Bancroft were also key figures in the J.P. Morgan financial
empire, further strengthening J.P. Morgan’s influence on the
Hepburn Bill.200 National labor leaders including Samuel
Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor
(the “AFL”), also played an important role. Moderate labor
interests such as the AFL strongly supported federal
chartering. They were particularly enthusiastic regarding
the NCF’s recommendation that labor unions be excluded
from the antitrust laws.201
Early drafts of the bill were structured as amendments to
the Sherman Act, adding a comprehensive system of
registration and publicity. Corporations could register with
the Bureau of Corporations by providing detailed
information regarding their business and financial structure.
Once registered, corporations would then be able to
“preclear” mergers, combinations, and other strategic
transactions by filing the relevant transaction documents
with the Bureau in advance. Corporations that chose not to
Id.
Id.
200 Gary was the president and chairman of United States Steel,
while Bancroft was counsel to International Harvester. Belmont,
Seligman, and Speyer were each prominent New York bankers. See
generally SKLAR, supra note 16, at 179-332 for a thorough discussion of
antitrust reform efforts and the key actors involved.
201 KOLKO, supra note 16, at 133–38; SKLAR, supra note 16, at 228-29.
198
199
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register were not prohibited from engaging in combinations,
but would continue to run the risk of Sherman Act
prosecution. This system would provide the federal
government with oversight over industrial combinations
while also providing national businesses one of their most
sought-after policy goals: eliminating the legal risk of
antitrust prosecution by obtaining regulatory clearance
before consummating major transactions. Essentially, rather
than using the Sherman Act as an ex post enforcement
mechanism, this system would give the federal government
the power of prophylactic supervision. For their part, labor
unions would be granted even stronger protection under the
bill, allowing them to escape the Sherman Act entirely by
making specified organizational disclosures. Under this
proposed framework, the Administration, big business, and
organized labor each seemed to be getting what they
wanted.202
Soon, however, the influence of Francis L. Stetson and
Victor
Morawetz—both
Morgan-associated
corporate
attorneys—began to push the bill in an even more probusiness direction. In late February 1908, Stetson and
Morawetz submitted a revised draft limiting Sherman Act
prosecution to “unfair” and “unreasonable” agreements and
combinations, even for corporations that chose not to register
with the Bureau of Corporations.203 This change would have
significantly weakened the Sherman Act, which contained no
exception for “reasonable” restraints of trade. The
Administration rejected Stetson and Morawetz’s proposal,
which would have undermined the government’s supervisory
authority. Still, the bill underwent several revisions as the
Morgan interests pressed for advantage. Eventually,
Roosevelt himself became personally involved and wrenched
the bill back to his own regulatory preferences. Central to
Roosevelt’s vision was a strong oversight role for the federal
government, including the assertion of executive authority

202 SKLAR, supra note 16, at 231–33; KOLKO, supra note 16, at 134;
WIEBE, BUSINESSMEN AND REFORM, supra note 15, at 80–81.
203 SKLAR, supra note 16, at 233-34.
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over the private decision making of corporations. Roosevelt
added stricter registration requirements and an expanded,
quasi-managerial role for the federal government. The bill
was finalized in March and sent to Representative Hepburn,
who introduced it in Congress in early 1908 as the Hepburn
amendments to the Sherman Act.204 Although the
Administration was surprisingly reserved in its endorsement
of the final bill (Roosevelt described it to Congress as a
tentative suggestion), political support appeared strong.205
Once in Congress, however, the bill attracted serious
criticism. Much of the controversy centered around the bill’s
favorable treatment of labor unions. Although large
corporations were willing to accommodate unions to secure
their political support, smaller businesses reacted extremely
negatively to the protection of unions from the antitrust
laws. The National Association of Manufacturers (“NAM”),
representing a broad cross-section of American business,
strongly opposed the bill, as did dozens of smaller
commercial and trade associations.206 Although the NAM
was supportive of the general concept of federal chartering, it
refused to accept any legislation that would strengthen the
position of labor unions. This opposition was hardly
surprising, as the NAM was a deeply anti-labor
organization,207 yet its intensity seemed to catch the NCF
leadership off guard.
Anti-labor opposition was strengthened by many
businesses’ worry that the government was aiding dominant
trusts at the expense of small and medium-sized enterprises.
The National Council of Industrial Defense, an umbrella
H.R. 19745, 60th Cong. (1908).
SKLAR, supra note 16, at 239.
206 Many of these associations were represented before Congress by
the attorney and lobbyist James A. Emery. See An Act to Regulate
Commerce: Hearings on House Bill 19745 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 60th Cong. 470–95, 663–93, 740–47 (1908) [hereinafter
Hearings on H.R. 19745]. The Hepburn Bill hearings also included more
than 100 letters and telegrams from individual firms and regional trade
associations, the majority of which expressed vociferous opposition to
favorable treatment of labor unions. See id. at 8–9, 432–70.
207 SKLAR, supra note 16, at 225–26.
204
205
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group of 130 commercial associations (led by the NAM),
voiced this concern to Administration officials directly,
stating that powerful unions and powerful trusts would
unfairly benefit from the legislation.208 From the opposite
end of the political spectrum, anti-corporate and pro-labor
interests also criticized the bill. The American Antitrust
League, for example, supported the protection of labor
unions, but feared that the bill provided large corporations
with undue latitude to merge and consolidate.209 Finally,
even corporatist reformers involved in drafting the
legislation had misgivings over the direction in which
Roosevelt had taken the bill. Corporate lawyers such as
Stetson and Morawetz, who had hoped for protective
legislation, now faced a much more expansive system of
federal supervision and control.210
In just a few short weeks, support for the bill unraveled.
As soon as Roosevelt realized that his preferred version was
unlikely to pass, he abandoned any serious efforts to promote
the legislation in Congress. Although Roosevelt continued to
call for congressional action, he spent little political capital
supporting corporate legislation that lacked what he
considered its most important feature—executive power to
approve or disapprove corporate combinations and horizontal
agreements.211 Seth Low and other NCF leaders tried to
persuade Roosevelt to strengthen his support, but the
President drew increasingly disengaged.212 Without
Roosevelt’s active backing, and amidst growing criticism
from across the political spectrum, the Hepburn Bill stalled
in the House Judiciary Committee by late spring.

See id. at 266–67.
See Hearings on H.R. 19745, supra note 206, at 336-64.
210 See SKLAR, supra note 16, at 235–53.
211 See Theodore Roosevelt, Special Message to Congress on Labor
(Mar. 25, 1908), in AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John
T. Woolley, eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php
?pid=69676 [perma.cc/29H7-L95K].
212 See KOLKO, supra note 16, at 136–38; SKLAR, supra note 16, at
274–76.
208
209
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The legislation fared even worse in the Senate, where it
was expressly rejected in January 1909 by the Senate
Judiciary Committee.213 The Committee refused to allow the
executive branch to make unilateral exceptions to the
Sherman Act. Not shying away from dramatic rhetoric, the
Committee report compared the presidential powers granted
under the bill to the dispensing prerogative of James II at
the time of the Glorious Revolution. According to the
Committee, the bill would allow the executive to punish or
excuse legal violations “without notice or hearing and wholly
ex parte—a course of procedure that would not be tolerated
in any court of our country.”214 The Committee broadly
opposed any weakening of the Sherman Act, which the bill
would “emasculate,” “undermine,” and render “nugatory as a
remedial statute.”215 In the Senate Judiciary Committee, at
least, anti-corporate sentiment remained strong.
The Hepburn Bill was the Roosevelt Administration’s
final attempt at corporate legislation, and its defeat
represented the broader failure of Roosevelt’s vision of
corporate reform. Despite the support for federal chartering
throughout Roosevelt’s presidency, the political consensus
needed to pass concrete legislation proved illusory. In a
sense, Roosevelt’s proposals included ideological aspects of
both the corporatist and anti-corporate perspectives: his
administration sought close cooperation between government
and big business but also insisted that corporate decision
making be subject to executive authority. Rather than
achieving compromise, Roosevelt alienated both camps. Anticorporate traditionalists, who valued the Sherman Act in its
original form, mistrusted any proposal to selectively
facilitate anticompetitive behavior. On the other hand, many
corporatists became increasingly uncomfortable with
Roosevelt’s regulatory proposals, which appeared to reach
considerably beyond their preferred level of government
control. Finally, favorable treatment of labor unions—

213
214
215

See S. REP. NO. 60-848 (1909).
Id. at 9.
Id. at 11.
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included to secure the support of the AFL—probably did
more than anything to ensure the failure of the Hepburn
Bill. While it is tempting to conclude that Roosevelt’s
political approach undermined the Hepburn Bill, the
succeeding administration proved no more successful in
passing similar legislation. As the experience of the Taft
Administration shows, disagreement over the purpose of
corporate reform was an insurmountable obstacle.

IV. FEDERALIZATION EFFORTS DURING THE
TAFT ADMINISTRATION
The end of Roosevelt’s presidency was not the end of the
federal chartering movement. Although the Hepburn Bill
had failed, proponents of federal chartering had much to
hope for in the Taft Administration. As Roosevelt’s political
protégé and hand-picked successor, Taft shared Roosevelt’s
views regarding the economic necessity of large corporations
and the importance of preventing them from abusing their
economic power. Many observers considered Taft even more
business-friendly than Roosevelt, giving optimism to large
corporations lobbying for protective regulation. Once in
office, however, Taft disappointed such expectations.
Although Taft supported federal chartering, his views on
corporate regulation proved more market-oriented than his
predecessor’s. Most notably, he was less inclined to favor the
legal protections sought after by big business.216 Taft found
himself in an awkward position between anti-corporate and
corporatist reformers, unable to build significant support for
his preferred (mildly corporatist) chartering legislation. Taft
did succeed, however, in enacting a corporation “excise” tax,
which included certain regulatory features that had long
been called for in chartering debates. In the context of

216 See SKLAR, supra note 16, at 364–81. To this day (and despite the
best efforts of historians), the popular image of Roosevelt is that of the
aggressive trust buster. Taft, on the other hand, is often considered more
conservative. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 15, at 236–54. As discussed
herein, these popular conceptions of Roosevelt and Taft are inaccurate in
important respects.
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repeated failure to pass a federal chartering bill, this tax
satisfied some of the demand for federal action toward
corporations and partially relieved the political pressure for
more comprehensive legislation.

A. Corporatist Proposals
Upon taking office in March 1909, Taft appeared likely to
continue the agenda of the Roosevelt Administration. Like
his mentor, Taft believed that large corporations were
inevitable in modern society and that federal law should
concern itself with actual economic abuses, not corporate size
per se. Unlike Roosevelt, however, Taft was not a proponent
of executive discretion and rejected the use of informal
relationships as a basis for distinguishing between “good”
and “bad” trusts. A jurist above all else, Taft was deeply
committed to the rule of law and strove for consistent
enforcement of existing antitrust prohibitions.217 Although
he
supported
federal
chartering
throughout
his
administration, Taft invested greater effort in prosecuting
trusts under the Sherman Act. Partly for this reason, he had
little success in promoting chartering legislation in Congress.
Notwithstanding the failure of the Hepburn Bill, the 1908
presidential election had primed Washington for further
regulatory proposals. The Democratic platform of 1908 called
for federal licensing of any corporation controlling “as much

217 Taft’s antitrust perspective—his belief in the jurisprudential
wisdom of allowing reasonable restraints of trade, coupled with his strong
commitment to impartial enforcement of the law—derived directly from
his experience as a federal judge for the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
where he was considered a leading expert on antitrust law. His decision in
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898)
holding that ancillary restraints of trade should be subject to a
reasonableness standard was later adopted by the Supreme Court. This
“rule of reason” is today considered one of the most important
developments in antitrust law. See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason
and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J.
775, 801 (1965).
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as twenty-five percent of the product in which it deals.”218
Although less specific, the Republican platform also called
for the regulation of large corporations, recommending that
the government enforce “greater supervision and control
over, and secure greater publicity in, the management of
that class of corporations” active in interstate commerce.219
Underscoring the bipartisan support for corporate reform,
Taft referenced both platforms favorably during his
campaign and called for legislation “inducing or compelling”
large corporations to submit “to registry and to proper
publicity regulations and supervision of the Department of
Commerce and Labor.”220
The first year of Taft’s presidency showed little progress
on the chartering front, however, as the Administration
focused its efforts on enacting a corporate income tax.221 In
early 1910, once the corporation tax had been enacted, Taft
formally proposed an incorporation law covering all firms
engaged in interstate commerce capitalized at $100,000 or
more.222 This proposal, which was introduced in Congress as
the “Clark-Parker bills,”223 would have subjected large
corporations to structural and operational constraints, but
218 Democratic Party Platform of 1908 (July 7, 1908), in AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, eds., 2017),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29589 [perma.cc/p3qn-8rmp].
219 Republican Party Platform of 1908 (June 16, 1908), in AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, eds., 2017),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29632 [perma.cc/g3aw-6mqf].
220 William H. Taft, Address Accepting the Republican Presidential
Nomination (July 28, 1908), in AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard
Peters
&
John
T.
Woolley,
eds.,
2017),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=76222 [perma.cc/ezm5vf7l].
221 See infra Section IV.C.
222 Urofsky, supra note 16, at 180–81.
223 The Clark-Parker bills were named after Administration allies
who sponsored the legislation: Senator Clarence Clark (R-WY), who
introduced a bill in the Senate, S. 6186, 61st Cong. (1910), and
Representative Richard Wayne Parker (R-NJ), who introduced the same
bill in the House, H.R. 20142, 61st Cong. (1910). As discussed below,
Parker’s support was particularly notable, as he represented the state of
New Jersey.

HUTCHISON – FINAL

No. 3:1017] PROGRESSIVE ERA CONCEPTIONS OF THE CORPORATION

1081

would also have protected corporations from state and
federal antitrust laws. Taft heralded the proposal as
beneficial both to individual corporations and the broader
economy, emphasizing the economic benefits of industrial
consolidation.224 Business interests praised the proposal and
the legal certainty that it offered.225 The measure was
opposed by the insurgent wing of the President’s own party,
who wanted a stricter, more punitive approach to corporate
regulation.226 Allying themselves with anti-corporate
Democrats, these insurgent Republicans demanded an
amendment allowing the government to revoke federal
charters, which would have provided a means of punishing
corporations that acted against the public interest.227 A
revocation provision was unacceptable to the corporatist
reformers supporting the bill, as it undermined the very
legal certainty that business interests most desired.228 The
legislation was thus condemned to yet another congressional
stalemate, in which Taft could do little to effectively
intervene.
The failure of the Clark-Parker bills speaks to the
awkward position of the Taft Administration, which had
managed to offend both business conservatives and
economically progressive Republicans. The history of the
bills also highlights an intriguing feature of the political
environment, however: the lack of organized political
resistance to federal legislation from New Jersey. Given the
See William H. Taft, Special Message (Jan. 7, 1910), in AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, eds., 2017),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=68486 [perma.cc/3p5tagxm].
225 Topics in Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1910, at 13.
226 In the politics of the era, “insurgent” Republicans were a large
element within the Republican Party who advocated a distinctly
progressive social, political, and economic agenda.
227 Hard Fight Ahead on Taft Trust Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1910, at
1; Has Repeal Clause: Federal Incorporation Bill Strengthened, N.Y. TRIB.,
Jan. 22, 1910, at 1; Taft’s Trust Bill Put in Final Form, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
28, 1910, at 5.
228 Incorporation Bill Will Not Be Pushed, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1910,
at 1.
224
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state’s financial interest in attracting and maintaining
corporate charters, one might have expected active
opposition from New Jersey political figures. By displacing
state corporate law—or by superimposing stricter national
standards—federal legislation would have undermined the
advantages of incorporating in New Jersey. Given the state’s
fiscal policies and the importance of corporate tax revenues,
New Jersey politicians had strong incentives to oppose
legislation at the federal level. Surprisingly, however, there
is no evidence of such opposition either in congressional
discussions or in journalistic coverage at the time. On the
contrary, Richard Parker, a long-serving Representative
from New Jersey, not only chaired the House Judiciary
Committee that oversaw the Clark-Parker bills, but
personally sponsored the legislation in cooperation with the
President, which strongly suggests that at least some New
Jersey politicians were motivated by non-parochial interests.
This suggestion is strengthened by the political
circumstances in which New Jersey lost its chartering crown
to Delaware—when the New Jersey legislature suddenly
passed several strict antitrust provisions in 1913.229 These
actions seem puzzling: Why did New Jersey political figures
fail to protect the state’s golden goose? The complacency of
New Jersey politicians in the face of threats to the state’s
chartering leadership may have reflected the decreasing
importance of franchise taxes to the state’s budget.230
According to the economic historian Christopher Grandy, a
developing industrial economy and rapidly increasing
population meant that corporate taxes were shrinking as a
portion of New Jersey’s total budget, particularly as the state
funded infrastructure spending with inheritance, property,
and railroad taxes.231 As the state became less reliant on
229 These provisions, known as the “seven sisters,” had been
advocated by outgoing governor Woodrow Wilson—a political figure with a
distinctly national (rather than local) political agenda. The immediate
result of these provisions was to drive corporations to relocate in
Delaware. See Grandy, supra note 42, at 688–91.
230 Id. at 685, 689.
231 Id. at 689–91.
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corporation revenues, legislators became more amenable to
Wilsonian progressivism.232
Following the failure of the Clark-Parker bills, Taft
continued to call for federal legislation, but his efforts are
best described as dutiful, rather than enthusiastic.
Comprising only two sentences, his request for a federal
chartering act in his second annual address to Congress was
perfunctory at best, seeming to acknowledge the unlikelihood
of successful congressional action. Reminding Congress that
he had previously recommended legislation, Taft merely
stated, “I renew my recommendation in that behalf.”233
Although the President himself seemed to have lost
interest, large corporations and their political allies
continued to lobby for corporatist legislation. These lobbying
efforts
remained
intensive
throughout
the
Taft
Administration, eventually leading to further consideration
of the chartering issue in Congress. The most notable
lobbying efforts were led by the NCF, which conducted a
survey of over 16,000 “representative Americans” (actually
weighted toward businesspeople and other professionals)
whom the NCF claimed overwhelmingly supported federal
incorporation.234 In 1911, the Senate Committee on
232 This is consistent with Roberta Romano’s explanation of
Delaware’s continuing dominance of incorporations. According to Romano,
a small state such as Delaware, which derives a major portion of its
revenues from corporation taxes, can more credibly commit to maintaining
favorable corporate law. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces
of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 277–78 (1985). In
addition, scholars of American federalism have observed that state
officials do not reliably promote state institutional interests.
Developments in New Jersey may have been an example of state officials
failing to defend state autonomy because federal regulation would advance
their own “partisan, ideological, or constituent interests.” Meriam Seifter,
States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 VA. L. REV.
953, 983 (2014).
233 William H. Taft, Second Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1910), in
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, eds.,
2017),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29551
[perma.cc/rzj4-6b6v].
234 See generally DEP’T ON REGULATION OF INDUS. CORPS. OF THE NAT’L
CIVIC FED’N, THE TRUST PROBLEM (1912).
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Interstate Commerce responded to NCF lobbying by holding
hearings on federal control over interstate corporations.
These hearings addressed a variety of approaches to the
corporation issue, with particular emphasis on federal
licensing or direct federal incorporation. They featured
copious amounts of testimony from NCF-affiliated business
representatives, many of whom continued to advocate for
protective federal law. Much of this testimony advocated
federal protection not just from state antitrust prosecution,
but from price competition as well. Seth Low (the NCF’s
president) called for a federal licensing system that would
have allowed horizontal combinations and even explicit price
fixing, so long as such combinations and collusive pricing
were approved by a federal agency.235 Elbert Gary, of U.S.
Steel, favored a somewhat stricter licensing law, though he
also envisioned the federal government approving
combinations and pricing agreements (and possibly even
setting prices itself). According to Gary, the Sherman Act
subjected businesses to paralyzing uncertainty, since it was
impossible to know prior to an enforcement action whether a
given transaction was lawful. Gary also claimed that
allowing firms to enter horizontal agreements would benefit
the economy by reducing economically destructive
“unrestrained” competition.236 As a final example, coal
industry lobbyist Walter Bogle called for protecting
corporations from state statutes, while also allowing them to
235 See Control of Corporations, Persons, and Firms Engaged in
Interstate Commerce: Hearing on S. 2941 Before the S. Comm. on Interstate
Commerce, 62nd Cong. 499-557 (1913) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 2941]
(statement of Seth Low, President, National Civic Federation).
236 Id. at 639–95, 726–30 (statement of Elbert H. Gary, Chairman and
CEO, U.S. Steel Corp.). Gary’s enthusiasm for price fixing was not merely
academic. Between 1907 and 1911, he had presided over the “Gary
dinners,” industry gatherings at which American steel companies reached
collusive (if informal) pricing agreements. These meetings had enjoyed the
tacit blessing of the Roosevelt Administration, and were not challenged
under the Sherman Act until the stricter antitrust enforcement of the Taft
presidency. Gary’s statist vision of business regulation was similar to that
of Roosevelt, and the two men maintained a friendly relationship
throughout Roosevelt’s tenure.
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enter into explicit price fixing agreements. Bogle’s testimony
was representative of many witnesses before the committee,
arguing that federal legislation should “eliminate or destroy
disastrous competition.”237
These various proposals were coolly received by the
Committee on Interstate Commerce, which saw little reason
to grant legal protections to already-powerful corporations
and which rejected the broadly statist implications of many
of the witnesses’ testimony. Indeed, the Senate was more
favorably disposed to moving in the opposite direction, by
strengthening the Sherman Act and more tightly regulating
combinations. To the disappointment of big business,
President Wilson adopted this approach in 1914.238 The
corporatist vision would not be realized, either during the
Taft Administration or after.

B. Anti-Corporate Proposals
The Committee on Interstate Commerce also considered
anti-corporate proposals. While the NCF was lobbying for
corporatist legislation, Democrats and insurgent Republicans
also introduced several bills. The most politically significant
of these bills were inspired by the writings of Robert R. Reed,
a New York attorney who had published an influential
incorporation proposal in 1909.239 Reed’s perspective was
diametrically opposed to the goals of the NCF. Reed believed
that monopoly power would only become more dangerous if
domesticated by the federal government. Rather than
seeking to control corporations through centralized
regulation, which would constitute “the beginning of the end
of those sound principals of government which are our
special heritage as a people,” Reed advocated strictly limiting
Id. at 2323–24 (statement of Walter S. Bogle, Coal Operator).
In addition to creating the FTC, the Federal Trade Commission
Act of 1914 prohibited a number of “unfair” trade practices. Similarly, the
Clayton Act (of the same year) strengthened federal antitrust law by
prohibiting certain acquisition transactions as well as “incipient”
monopolization.
239 See Robert R. Reed, American Democracy and Corporate Reform,
ATLANTIC, Jan. 1909, at 114.
237
238
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the size and scope of corporations themselves.240 Although
none of the bills inspired by Reed’s writings became law,
they illustrate the deep divide between corporatist and anticorporate ideologies.
Among Reed-inspired bills, the proposal that attracted
the greatest support was the so-called Williams Bill,
introduced in 1911 by Senator John Sharp Williams (DMS).241 In its original form, the Williams Bill was not an
incorporation measure per se, in that it nominally preserved
the existing system of state corporation acts. However, the
bill included strict rules regarding the business activities,
governance, and capitalization of any corporation engaged in
interstate commerce, such that the corporate laws of the
several states would have been rendered largely irrelevant.
The bill attracted little attention when first introduced in
Congress, but was taken more seriously when Williams
reintroduced a revised version in 1912, when it was assigned
for consideration to the Committee on Interstate
Commerce.242
In presenting his bill to the Committee, Williams
emphasized Robert R. Reed’s direct influence on the
legislation. Not only had Williams drawn inspiration from
Reed’s articles, he had directly corresponded with Reed
throughout the drafting process and gave the New Yorker
substantial credit for formulating the details of the bill.243
The bill reflected both men’s view that government and
business should be kept separate, and that corporate
regulation was best administered through non-discretionary
statutory rules. Claiming to be an opponent of centralization,
Williams insisted that his bill was not a federal incorporation
measure, even though its implementation would federalize
most aspects of corporate law. This incongruence
notwithstanding, the bill did address Williams’s fear of
business/government corruption by removing discretionary
Id.
S. 1377, 62nd Cong. (1911).
242 S. 4747, 62nd Cong. (1912).
243 Hearing on S. 2941, supra note 235, at 2503–05 (statement of Sen.
John Sharp Williams).
240
241
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decision making from the hands of the federal executive. The
bill set forth clear, narrow, ex ante limits on corporations
that no government official could waive, modify, or
reinterpret. Criticizing the regulatory proposals favored by
many Republicans, Williams warned, “I can imagine nothing
more dangerous to the American Republic than control of
great corporations by a Federal bureau subject in its turn to
a political administration of either party.”244
Reed himself also testified in support of the Williams Bill.
Like Williams, Reed insisted that the legislation did not
federalize corporate law. In Reed’s view, the real issue was
not state versus federal law, but rather the distinction
between ex ante legal rules, which would clearly and
specifically limit corporate abuses, and ex post discretion
over the enforcement of malleable standards, which lent
itself to a dangerous intercourse of government and
corporate power.245 Reed’s perspective on corporations was
shared by many of the nation’s newspapers, and several
editorials were entered into the legislative record. The
Indianapolis Star, for example, criticized protective
regulation, calling instead for a “punitive and prohibitive”
federal corporation act.246 The Grand Rapids Herald
expressed a similar view, praising Reed’s plan for “radical
reform.”247 The Pittsburg Dispatch supported vesting
corporate law in the federal government, thereby freeing it
from state-level corruption and restoring its focus on the
public interest.248 This support for Reed’s proposals reflected
widespread public demand for strict, forceful, and publicoriented legislation.
Notwithstanding this support, the Committee on
Interstate Commerce declined to report any corporation bill,
whether of the NCF or the Williams/Reed variety. Given the
major differences of opinion regarding the basic goals of
corporate regulation, the committee concluded that federal
244
245
246
247
248

Id. at 2508 (quoting an earlier letter to Congress).
See id. at 446–72 (statement of Robert R. Reed, Attorney).
Id. at 2515 (statement of Sen. John Sharp Williams).
Id. at 2516.
Id. at 2517.
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legislation was “neither necessary nor desirable.”249 In
explaining its decision, the committee emphasized the
intellectual divide between the two sides of the debate, which
it characterized as an ideological contest between
“competition,” on the one hand, and “regulated monopoly or
concentration,” on the other.250 Acknowledging that “there
are many distinguished students and highly trained thinkers
who believe that the age of competition is past,” the
committee nonetheless rejected the NCF’s proposals for
government supervision of output and pricing agreements.251
The committee was also unwilling to support restrictive
measures such as the Williams Bill. Given the difficulty of
reaching political agreement on any form of corporate
legislation, the Williams Bill was no more viable than the
pro-corporate NCF proposals. Rather than support either,
the committee issued a vague recommendation to convert the
Bureau of Corporations into an independent commission
tasked with investigating corporations, enforcing federal
antitrust law, and providing advance review of mergers and
combinations.252 That the committee sought to defer any
actual policymaking to a hypothetical future commission, the
powers of which would be an unlikely combination of both
anti-corporate and corporatist reform proposals, is testament
to the political difficulties of corporate legislation during the
Taft Administration. Once again, federal chartering had
been rendered politically infeasible—not by any particular
support for the existing system of state corporate law—but
rather by intractable disagreement over the nature of its
replacement.

C. Successful Enactment of the Corporation Tax
Although
the
chartering
efforts
of
the
Taft
Administration failed, Taft did succeed in working with
Congress to pass an alternate form of corporate legislation.
249
250
251
252

S. REP. NO. 62-1326, at 2 (1913).
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 12–13.
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In 1909, the Administration oversaw passage of a federal
corporate income tax—the immediate predecessor to the
personal income tax of 1913.253 While primarily a tax
measure, the 1909 Act also responded to more general
demands for corporate reform, and its enactment had the
practical effect of reducing pressure for broader legislation.
As Marjorie Kornhauser has documented, the corporation
tax of 1909 advanced several progressive policy objectives,
including mandatory corporate publicity and reduced
overcapitalization.254 Partly due to these objectives, the tax
was an unusual piece of legislation, serving multiple political
goals that were often at cross-purposes. Indeed, the tax itself
had originally been conceived by conservative Republicans as
a means of deflecting political pressure for a federal personal
income tax. Facing growing criticism of economic inequality
and mounting demands for federal income taxation, many
congressional Republicans believed a (small) corporate
income tax was preferable to enactment of a “radical”
personal income tax. During the legislative process, however,
this deflection strategy was joined together with debates
over corporate law, and the corporation tax acquired an
additional aspect as a mild form of corporate regulation.255
Under the new tax law, corporations were required to submit
financial information to the federal government, achieving—
to a significant degree—the publicity desired by corporate
reformers.256 The tax was also designed to discourage
overcapitalization and overleveraging by limiting the
amount of interest on debt that corporations could deduct
from taxable income. Specifically, interest deduction was
253 Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 61-5, § 38, 36 Stat.
11 (1909) (providing revenue, equalizing duties, and encouraging the
industries of the United States among other purposes). “Although
Congress characterized this tax as a special excise tax on corporate profits,
it was a corporate income tax for all intents and purposes.” Hutchison,
supra note 19, at 102 n.19.
254 See generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and
the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53 (1990).
255 Id. at 94–114.
256 § 38, 36 Stat. at 112–17 (providing revenue, equalizing duties, and
encouraging the industries of the United States among other purposes).
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limited to debt “not exceeding paid-up capital,” reducing the
incentives for corporations to carry large amounts of debt or
unpaid stock in their capital structures.257
The tax’s disclosure requirement addressed a variety of
corporate evils, including monopolistic pricing, abusive trade
practices, and the sale of overvalued stock. Although
protecting investors from overcapitalization (that is,
protecting them from the sale of overpriced stock) was an
early motivation for the Act, the final version focused on
disclosure to the government, rather than disclosure to the
general public. Earlier versions included a provision that all
corporate tax returns “and all documentary evidence and
notes of testimony taken and filed in connection therewith,
shall constitute public records and be open to inspection as
such.”258 This language providing for public inspection was
removed from the final bill, however. In addition, the final
version prohibited federal officials from disclosing any
corporate information without authorization from the
President.259 This change was a direct response to
conservative opposition to public disclosure—in the view of
many business figures, disclosure to the government was
more acceptable than disclosure to the general public.
Although many politicians supported corporate publicity,
and some specifically supported shareholder disclosure,
investor protection was simply not a political priority and
was easily discarded as part of the political bargaining
process.
As enacted, the corporation tax satisfied some of the
demand for federal corporate regulation, but it was not a
substitute for comprehensive federal law. Many progressive
lawmakers had sought broader publicity requirements and
were therefore disappointed with the final version of the Act.
More to the point, the tax provided little in the way of
substantive regulation, and beyond providing the
Kornhauser, supra note 254, at 113.
Id.
259 § 38(7), 36 Stat. at 116 (providing revenue, equalizing duties, and
encouraging the industries of the United States among other purposes).
Kornhauser, supra note 254, at 113–14.
257
258
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information necessary for assessing tax liability, it was
unclear as to what purpose its reporting provisions were
meant to serve. The best evidence of the Act’s inadequacy in
the view of many corporate reformers was the fact that
federal chartering legislation continued to be introduced in
Congress.260
Nevertheless, the tax’s symbolism remained important. It
demonstrated that the Republican-controlled government
was willing to enact corporate legislation, while at the same
time assuring the business community that it would not
enact anything radical. Despite disappointment with the
tax’s relatively weak substantive provisions, it likely diffused
at least some of the energy behind more ambitious
chartering proposals. The enactment of additional reforms
under the Woodrow Wilson Administration—combined with
the seeming impossibility of agreement on federal
chartering—would eventually lead to the end of chartering
as a congressional legislative goal. Ultimately, in an era
marked by ambitious reforms, the chartering movement
would distinguish itself, both in the breadth of its political
appeal and the decisiveness of its failure.

V. CONCLUSION
Woodrow Wilson’s victory in the election of 1912 spelled
the end of federal chartering as a viable political movement.
Despite his political identity as a Democrat and his support
among anti-corporate populists (including William Jennings
Bryan), Wilson himself showed little enthusiasm for any
form of federal chartering. Like many congressional
Democrats, Wilson rejected the Rooseveltian distinction
between “good” and “bad” industrial trusts, and was
suspicious of big business’s enthusiasm for federal
regulation. Unlike his party’s populist wing, however, Wilson
accepted the inevitability of large, integrated corporations
and declined to support legislative attempts to dramatically
260 Nor did the corporation tax placate personal income tax
proponents. Following the Sixteenth Amendment, a personal income tax
was enacted in 1913.
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limit their economic power. Although Wilson’s political
discourse included its share of anti-corporate rhetoric, a
strict system of federal chartering was simply not on his
political agenda.261
The Wilson Administration did enact several alternative
regulatory measures, however, that reduced the demand for
comprehensive legislation. Under Wilson, the Senate finally
adopted the Committee on Interstate Commerce’s
recommendation for an independent commission by enacting
the Federal Trade Commission Act in September 1914.262
Less than a month later, the Senate enacted the Clayton Act,
which reinforced the Sherman Act by prohibiting several
types of “unfair” trade practices as well as “incipient”
monopolization.263 In tandem, these two acts achieved
important goals of both factions of corporate reformers. The
Clayton Act appealed to anti-corporate populists who
demanded stronger antitrust enforcement. The creation of
the FTC, on the other hand, gave many business figures the
greater outcome certainty of a centralized, non-judicial
regulatory body. Although neither Act could fully satisfy
corporate reformers’ conflicting goals, they nevertheless
dulled the political momentum behind more ambitious
chartering proposals. Federal incorporation was eclipsed
altogether by the economic and political exigencies of World
War I, and remained forgotten during the stock market boom
and economic prosperity of the 1920s. Moreover, with the
rise of widespread public shareholding in the decade
following the war, corporate law would come to embody a
new and different political character. As the public became
increasingly involved with corporations as investors, their
protection as such became the primary goal of federal

261 The new President endorsed none of the seven incorporation bills
introduced in the year following his inauguration. Urofsky, supra note 16,
at 182.
262 Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012)).
263 Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2012)).
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corporate regulation—a change evidenced by the federal
securities laws of the early 1930s.
Although the Progressive Era was the period of strongest
support for federal chartering, similar proposals have
reemerged twice since in American history—first during the
New Deal, and again following the corporate governance
scandals of the 1970s. In 1935, as the country struggled to
recover from the Great Depression, Senator Joseph
O’Mahoney (D-WY) proposed a federal licensing system that
explicitly borrowed its core provisions from the Williams Bill
of 1912.264 Responding to the political shift toward greater
concern for investors, O’Mahoney framed his bill in terms of
protecting corporate shareholders. In presenting his bill to
the Senate, O’Mahoney explained that its goal was not only
“to maintain high standards of living for labor [and] to make
possible the adoption of fair methods of competition,” but
also “to protect the investor from the obvious abuses of
corporate power from which the country has suffered for a
generation.”265 However, O’Mahoney’s bill sought to achieve
these goals by way of a mandatory federal license that would
have required strict adherence with labor, antitrust, and
consumer protection standards—many of which were directly
at odds with shareholders’ economic interests. When first
introduced, O’Mahoney’s proposal attracted considerable
political support and seemed to have a real possibility of
eventually becoming law. Cast by its supporters as a
spiritual successor to the National Industrial Recovery Act,
the proposal was variously endorsed by President Roosevelt,
the American Federation of Labor, and the influential
Senator William Borah (R-ID) (who would co-sponsor a
revised version of the bill). But as the proposal advanced in
Congress, it was bitterly opposed by business interests,
which had set themselves in committed opposition to any
and all New Deal legislation.266 Even the mainstream press
S. 3363, 74th Cong. (1935).
79 CONG. REC. 12,551 (1935).
266 Borah License Bill Lashed as Dictator Peril, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec.
2, 1937, at 29; Assail License Bill as Doom of Home Rule, CHI. DAILY TRIB.,
Feb. 7, 1938, at 21; Chamber Denounces Corporation Licensing, L.A.
264
265

HUTCHISON – FINAL

1094

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2017

harshly criticized the measure, reflecting broader
disillusionment with the ambitious policies of the “second”
New Deal.267
Beset by political criticism, the bill became stranded in
Congress. In 1938, Roosevelt abandoned the fight for his
most controversial economic proposals and instead
recommended, as a face-saving measure, creation of the
Temporary National Economic Committee (the “TNEC”), a
special investigative body chaired by O’Mahoney and
charged with recommending economic legislation. But the
onset of World War II again sidelined corporate reform. After
the war, O’Mahoney resumed his campaign to implement the
TNEC’s legislative recommendations. But, given the
surprisingly strong postwar economy, there was no longer
significant political interest in fundamentally reforming
corporate law. Although the decades following World War II
saw major tax and antitrust legislation, Congress appeared
increasingly willing to leave corporate law to the states.
Federal chartering’s second revival occurred in the mid1970s, following a rash of corporate governance scandals at
major American corporations. Highly publicized instances of
fraud, negligence, and managerial incompetence at several
major firms—combined with revelations of foreign bribery
and illegal campaign contributions—led to new proposals for
federalizing corporate law. In 1974, Columbia law professor
and former SEC Chairman William Cary called for federal
minimum standards to be imposed on state corporations.268
In presenting his proposal, Cary specifically criticized
Delaware, denouncing the system of state corporate law “in
TIMES, Jan. 30, 1938, at 7; Manufacturers Attack Federal Licensing Bill,
N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Feb. 7, 1938, at 5; Federal Licensing of Trade Opposed,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1938, at 4.
267 A Bill To Halt Progress, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 9, 1938, at 16; The
Licensing Threat, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Dec. 31, 1937; Out of the Moth Balls,
N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Feb. 8, 1938, at 10. Historians refer to Roosevelt’s
ambitious economic proposals of 1935–1936 as the “second” New Deal (as
distinguished from the emergency measures of the original New Deal).
Following the onset of a “double dip” recession in 1937–1938, these
proposals faced significant political backlash.
268 Cary, supra note 11, at 700–03.
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which a pygmy among the 50 states prescribes, interprets,
and indeed denigrates national corporate policy as an
incentive to encourage incorporation within its borders.”269
Cary’s proposal sparked a vigorous debate among legal
scholars but had less of an impact in politics than in
academia.270
A more politically salient proposal came in 1976, when
the consumer advocate Ralph Nader—together with his
associates Mark Green and Joel Seligman—proposed federal
incorporation of all major industrial, retail, and
transportation firms.271 In addition to federalizing
corporations outright, the Nader proposal called for a
dramatic restructuring of corporate boards, assigning each
director specific oversight over one of several “corporate
responsibility” issues, including employee welfare, consumer
protection, and environmental responsibility.272 Nader’s
proposal was published in the form of an accessible, wellwritten monograph, which partly inspired congressional
hearings on federal incorporation in 1976 and 1977.273
Although Nader’s proposal was not the sole subject of the
hearings, it featured prominently in witness testimony,
either as an inspiration or a foil (depending on the witness).
In any case, these hearings failed to culminate in any
concrete legislation, and the renascent interest in federal
incorporation soon faded from the political scene. Part of the
reason for this lack of legislative action was the ambitious
nature of the Nader proposal itself, which sought to reform,
Id. at 701.
The major rejoinder to Cary’s proposal came from Yale law
professor Ralph Winter, who argued that Delaware law provided an
economically efficient level of shareholder protection. Winter, supra note
12, at 254. This debate over the efficiency of Delaware law has become a
defining feature of the corporate law literature. See supra notes 8–12 and
accompanying text.
271 NADER ET AL., supra note 11, at 62–74.
272 Id.
273 Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Hearings Before the Comm.
of Commerce, 94th Cong. (1976); The Role of the Shareholder in the
Corporate World: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and S’holders
Rights and Remedies of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. (1977).
269
270
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in dramatic fashion, nearly every aspect of corporate law,
reaching far beyond the practical limits of what was
politically feasible at the time. Perhaps more damning, the
various objectives of the Nader plan were often in direct (if
unacknowledged) conflict. Nader presented his chartering
proposal as protecting the interests of shareholders, for
example, while at the same time advocating expansive duties
to consumers, labor, and community interests that would
have almost certainly reduced shareholder value. Echoing
both the New Deal-era O’Mahoney Bill and the Progressive
Era chartering movement, Nader’s proposal was undermined
by mutually inconsistent goals.
Although debates over the merits of Delaware law
continue,274 and federal incorporation proposals still
occasionally appear in the academic literature,275
comprehensive federalization of corporate law has not been
politically viable since the 1970s. This is partly due to the
piecemeal federalization that has occurred over the last
several decades. Developments in federal securities
regulation, on the part of both Congress and the SEC, have
made increasing inroads into the internal governance of
state-chartered corporations, steadily reducing the practical
significance of placing corporations under direct federal
control.
Even more important has been the long-term shift in
academic and political opinion regarding the fundamental
policy objectives that corporate law is meant to achieve.
During the Progressive Era, corporate law was often
conceived as defining the fundamental relationship between
corporations and society. Differing perspectives on this
relationship gave rise to the political conflicts that defined
the federal chartering movement. Anti-corporate reformers
believed corporations should be limited to the small,
See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 13, at 610–14; George
W. Dent, Jr., For Optional Federal Incorporation, 35 J. CORP. L. 499, 499–
500 (2010); Steven A. Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law:
Optimizing Regulatory Structures for a Race to the Top, 24 YALE J. ON REG.
313, 347–58 (2007).
274
275
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independent businesses that had traditionally formed the
American economy. They therefore conceived the purpose of
corporate law to be restricting corporations’ economic and
political power. For their part, corporatist reformers saw
large corporations as an inevitable feature of modern
economic life, holding within them the economic potential to
benefit all strata of American society. They therefore
considered corporate law a protective form of regulation,
curbing corporations’ excesses, perhaps, but also providing
them with legal certainty. The modern conception of the
corporation as a politically neutral nexus of contracts—and
the emphasis of corporate law on reducing the agency costs
of professional management—simply did not exist, partly
due to a closer identity between the management and
ownership of many large firms, but also due to a
fundamentally different political conception of corporations
themselves. Rather than simply a legal technology for
organizing business and allocating capital, corporations were
viewed, whether positively or negatively, as the political
embodiment of economic change.
Today, popular hostility to corporations remains a
powerful force in American politics, but it no longer plays a
meaningful role in actual corporate lawmaking.276 The
276 In general, popular agitation has shifted from the existence of
large corporations themselves to more specific manifestations of their
economic and political influence. Citizens United, corporate tax avoidance,
and financial sector regulation have all become causes célèbres among the
political left (and among some on the right). Hillary Clinton—widely
considered a centrist—addressed each of these issues in her 2016
presidential campaign, illustrating the populist influence on contemporary
mainstream politics. See Benjamin Oreskes, Clinton Pledges
Constitutional Amendment to Overturn Citizens United Ruling, POLITICO
(July 16, 2016, 1:28 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/hillaryclinton-citizens-united-225658 [perma.cc/FBW8-ZHMU]; Bob Bryan,
Hillary Clinton Rips into Wall Street and Corporate America in a Fiery
Speech,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Oct.
3,
2016,
5:47
PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/hillary-clinton-rips-wall-streetcorporations-wells-fargo-in-speech-2016-10 [perma.cc/7NEP-JUF8]. Even
Donald Trump criticized Wall Street on the campaign trail, though his
administration now favors reducing financial regulation. See Brent A.
Sutton, Eight Questions About the Future of Banking Regulation Under
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central issue of modern corporate law is no longer the
corporation’s political legitimacy, but rather the narrower
concern of maximizing shareholder value. In an economy in
which most Americans are directly or indirectly corporate
investors,277 this change in the focus of corporate law is
entirely understandable. Moreover, assuming investor
returns and social returns are at least roughly correlated,
this shift is likely a positive development from a broader
normative policy perspective. In terms of our historical
understanding of the evolution of corporate law, however, it
risks obscuring the much different perspectives of an earlier
political era, in which the public interest and the interests of
investors were often considered to be in conflict, and in
which the former was granted intellectual and political
priority over the latter. It is important to remember these
earlier perspectives and the regulatory visions to which they
aspired, if only to realize that modern corporate law could
have taken a different form.
Had corporate law been successfully federalized in the
early years of the twentieth century, it may have evolved to
reflect the same economic concerns that dominate corporate
law today. The institutional structure of American business
would surely look much different, however. It would likely be
more uniform, less flexible, and subject to stricter national
standards. It would likely be more closely attuned to the
policy agenda of the federal government, and therefore
beholden to the changing priorities of changing political
leadership. Finally, the legal issues historically resolved by
the Delaware judiciary would likely have been instead
Trump,
WASH.
POST:
MONKEY
CAGE
(Nov.
23,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/11/23/8questions-about-the-future-of-banking-regulation-under-trump/
[perma.cc/U8ZW-GXRG].
277 If not through direct exposure to the stock market (mutual funds,
pension funds, etc.), then through health, life, or property-casualty
insurance. Judge Leo Strine suggests that ordinary Americans’ exposure
to capital markets constitutes a form of “forced capitalism.” Leo E. Strine,
Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of
Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 4–5 (2007).
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resolved by non-specialist federal courts. Whether these
institutional differences would have been for better or for
worse, it is important to emphasize that their failure to occur
was not due to a commitment to corporate law federalism—a
concept of relatively recent vintage espoused by neither side
of the chartering debate. Both anti-corporate and corporatist
reformers sought to replace the state-based system, but held
fundamentally different notions regarding the nature of its
successor. In the wake of this political conflict between
opposing regulatory perspectives, the liberal conception of
corporate law as embodied by the New Jersey act—in which
size, structure, and business operations are freely
determined by private decision making—has evolved into a
functional and (for the most part) stable national system,
despite the absence of direct supervision on the part of the
federal government. Were they alive to see it, this result
would come as a profound surprise to the corporate
reformers of the Progressive Era, who saw federalization as
the necessary, inevitable future of corporate law.

